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ABSTRACT 
The Iraq War began on March 30, 2003, prompted by the US-led invasion of Iraq. 
This major, long-lasting conflict resulted in a drastic increase in the number of internally 
displaced Iraqis as well as Iraqi refugees.  The resulting stream of Iraqi refugees is known 
as the Iraqi refugee crisis. This thesis first conducts a literature review the field of refugee 
studies, including a review of major theoretical works. From this review emerge theories 
and frameworks governing the root causes of refugee crises and the resulting 
consequences. Within the context of the Iraq War, this thesis then analyzes the policy 
response of the United States to the Iraqi refugee crisis. This analysis is comprised of 
various models of factors and variables that influence national and international refugee 
policy. The conclusion suggests that national security considerations, bureaucratic 
tension due to a principal-agent relationship between Congress and the president, as well 
as wider foreign policy and Iraqi-US relations, were the major factors that influenced the 
US policy response. Eventually, additional moral and ethical considerations provoked a 
change in policy, making the United States more receptive to Iraqi refugee admissions. In 
doing so, this thesis presents the US policy response against the backdrop of the United 
Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, the body governing 
the international refugee regime. It suggests that compliance with its mandate has become 
increasingly difficult, as the landscape of refugee flows has evolved over the twentieth 
century.  
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INTRODUCTION: OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE REGIME  
 
The prepared statement by Representative Gary Ackerman, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, during a 2008 hearing before the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs went as follows: 
…Almost a year ago, the Middle East and South Asia subcommittee held a 
hearing on the Iraqi refugee crisis and we learned several disturbing things. We 
learned that the Administration was doing next to nothing to assist those Iraqis 
who put their lives in jeopardy in order to assist the United States in our efforts in 
Iraq. Not only wasn’t the Administration helping them, they didn’t even know 
how many Iraqis actually worked for us, so they naturally had no idea how many 
people needed our help. We learned that the Administration was woefully 
unprepared to process refugees referred to us by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees. We learned that it took up to 5 months to process a 
refugee referral. We learned that the United States had the capacity to process 
merely a few hundred refugees a month but wasn’t working anywhere near even 
that limited capacity. We learned that we were telling Iraqis seeking our 
assistance and protection to flee to a safe place—like Syria—because we weren’t 
processing at risk populations in Iraq. And we learned that the need for refugee 
assistance was so great that Congress ultimately had to take the lead in providing 
an additional $150 million to address it.1 
 
In his statement, Representative Ackerman expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
response of the United States to the Iraqi refugee crisis as of 2007. His dissatisfaction 
stemmed from a belief in the fundamental principles governing the international refugee 
regime. By invoking the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
Ackerman invoked the obligations and responsibilities of the United States regarding 
refugee protection. What follows is a history of UNHCR and a discussion of how 
                                                      
1 House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Neglected Responsibilities: The U.S. Response To The Iraqi 
Refugee Crisis: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia and the Subcommittee 
on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight. 110th Cong., 2nd sess., March 11, 2008: 1. 
 2 
refugees came to be a legally protected class. Although the refugee regime was 
established over fifty years ago, recent events such as the Iraqi refugee crisis demonstrate 
its relevance and permanence in today’s world. By comparing the US response to the 
Iraqi refugee crisis with historical and academic refugee crisis models, patterns 
surrounding state action and compliance with the international refugee regime emerge.  
At present, UNHCR acts as the de facto authority on refugee statistics and data. 
As per Resolution 319 (IV) of December 3, 1949, the United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly decided to establish a High Commissioner for Refugees Office. On December 
14, 1950, the UN General Assembly adopted the Statute of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.2 The general provisions of the Statute state 
that the High Commissioner, acting under the authority of the General Assembly, must 
provide international protection to refugees.  The High Commissioner must also assist 
governments and acceptable private organizations with the goal of voluntary repatriation, 
refugee assimilation, and the end goal of the permanent solution for the problem of 
refugees. Provision II of the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees stipulates that the work of the High Commissioner will be 
entirely non-political in character and instead be humanitarian and social.3   
The current UN High Commissioner for Refugees is António Guterres. On June 
15, 2005, Guterres became the tenth person elected to this position by the UN General 
                                                      
2 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
(Geneva, Switzerland: 1954): 2. In paragraph 4 of the Statute, the Economic and Social Council also 
established an Advisory Committee on Refugees. This was later reconstituted as the United Nations 
Refugee Fund (UNREF) Executive Committee. The Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s 
Programme later replaced UNREF in 1958. 
3 Ibid., 6. 
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Assembly. After serving his five-year term, Guterres was elected to a second five-year 
term in April 2010.4 As High Commissioner, Guterres heads UNHCR and leads 
UNHCR’s actions to implement humanitarian programs worldwide. 
The establishment of UNHCR coincided with the ratification of the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Convention, as 
well as the later Protocol of 1967, provides the basis of international refugee protection 
today. The Convention is grounded in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948, which recognizes the right of persons to seek asylum abroad from 
persecution in their home countries. The Convention and Protocol also echo the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in affirming the right to leave one’s country and 
the right to seek asylum. The physical act of border crossing is central to the international 
refugee regime. The ability of refugees to access international protection is dependent 
upon their ability to cross international borders and leave their country of origin. The 
Convention and Protocol seek to protect refugee rights surrounding the highly divisive 
and controversial subject area of border crossing.5  
The 1951 Convention was formulated after World War II and designed 
specifically to protect European refugees fleeing the conflict.6 Its original wording was 
limited to providing protection to individuals fleeing events that had occurred before 
                                                      
4 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “The High Commissioner.” Last modified 2013. Accessed March 
13, 2013. http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c8.html. 
5 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “No Entry! A review of UNHCR's response to border closures in 
situations of mass refugee influx,” June 2010, PDES/2010/07, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c21ad0b2.html [accessed 1 October 2012]: 1-2. 
6 UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 7. “The development of the post-
1951 refugee protection regime was directly influenced by the experiences of the 1930s, in which the 
nascent asylum regime collapsed and borders were closed to huge numbers of refugees fleeing fascism in 
both Spain and Germany.” 
 4 
January 1, 1951. The 1967 Protocol, the only amendment to the 1951 Convention, 
removed these limitations and expanded the scope of the Convention as refugee 
displacement became a global problem. The 1967 Protocol thus removed the geographic 
and temporal limits of the 1951 Convention regarding modern refugee protection. 
The Convention and Protocol set in motion the movement of the international 
community to assemble a set of guidelines and laws in order to ensure the protection and 
humane treatment of refugees. The Convention and Protocol are the only international 
legal instruments that answer the questions Who is considered a refugee? and, What is 
the definition of a refugee?  The Convention and Protocol also describe the kind of legal 
protection, social assistance and human rights to which refugees are entitled. These 
documents simultaneously define a refugee’s obligations to a host country and specify 
certain narrow categories of people, such as war criminals, who cannot qualify for 
refugee status.7 
Embedded in the Convention and Protocol are fundamental principles of the 
international refugee regime. These are the principles of non-discrimination, non-
penalization and non-refoulement. The principle of non-discrimination states that 
Convention provisions must be “applied without discrimination as to race, religion or 
country of origin.” Advancements in international human rights law have also reinforced 
the principle that the Convention be applied without discrimination as to sex, age, 
disability, sexuality, or other prohibited grounds of discrimination.8 
                                                      
7 António Guterres. “A Personal Appeal from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.” 
UNHCR (September 2011): 1-12. 
8 UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 3. 
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 The principle of non-penalization states that refugees should not be penalized for 
their illegal entry or stay in a host country during any time in the process of seeking 
asylum. This principle would prohibit charging refugees with immigration or criminal 
offenses for their illegal entry, as well as detaining them arbitrarily or solely on the basis 
of their status as asylum-seekers. This provision is an acknowledgment that seeking 
asylum may require refugees to break traditional immigration rules.9 
The principle of non-refoulement is considered “so fundamental that no 
reservations or derogations may be made to it.”10 It provides that a state may not expel or 
return (refouler) a refugee against his or her will to a country where he or she faces 
serious threats to his or her life or freedom.11 This principle is a way to safeguard 
refugees from arbitrary expulsion.12 As recently as 2001, signatory states issued a 
Declaration reaffirming their commitment to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, 
and they formally recognized that the core principle of non-refoulement is specifically 
embedded in customary international law.13 The Convention additionally establishes 
basic minimum standards for the treatment of refugees. These rights include access to 
state courts, to primary education, to work, and to the provision of refugee and travel 
documentation. Under the Convention, refugees are granted travel documents in the form 
of a passport.14  
Although based in a specific historical context and born out of the refugee crisis 
                                                      
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 2. 
11 Refouler may be translated from French to English as “to force back” or “to turn away.” 
12 Guterres, 6. 
13 UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 4. 
14 Ibid., 3. 
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following World War II, the Convention and Protocol have become even more important 
for global governance as the number of refugees continues to increase. UNHCR 
maintains its mandate, and signatory states are required to uphold the Convention’s 
principles and standards. Huge growth in refugee numbers has kept UNHCR’s mandate 
relevant and essential. According to UNHCR, refugee growth over the course of the 20th 
century stems specifically from the increase in the number of source countries (countries 
of origin) from which refugees flee. By its data, in 1970, refugees existed from 16 total 
source countries. By 1980, the number of sources countries had increased to 32. In 1990, 
that number reached 43 source countries.15  
The increase in the number of refugees has meant that beneficial repatriation of a 
small number of refugees has become increasing difficult. Prior to the mid-1970s, the 
majority of refugees eventually returned home, despite the fact that many cases were 
prolonged and some unresolved.16 UNHCR estimates that between 1971 and 1975, annual 
repatriations represented 25% of the total refugee population of about 2.4 million people. 
Between 1976 and 1980, just 3.5% of 4.9 million refugees were successfully repatriated. 
During the 1980, repatriations made up only 2.5% refugee scenarios annually. The trend 
of increasingly overwhelming refugee flows coupled with frequently prolonged security 
threats in the country of origin has resulted in alternatives to repatriation as viable 
solutions to refugee crises.17 
As highlighted by these increasing numbers, refugee issues and policy are as 
                                                      
15 J. Craig Jenkins and Susanne Schmeidl. “Flight From Violence: The Origins and Implications of The 
World Refugee Crisis.” Sociological Focus 28, no. 1 (February 1, 1995): 71. 
16 Harto Hakovirta. “The Global Refugee Problem: A Model and Its Application.” International Political 
Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique 14, no. 1 (January 1, 1993): 35.  
17 Jenkins and Schmeidl, 70. 
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important, if not more important, for academics today. The international refugee regime 
has not altered its core principles since the enactment of the Convention and Protocol, but 
these principles have remained open to interpretation. Even as the Convention and 
Protocol remain unchanged, important characteristics of modern refugee flows have 
changed. Instead of large refugee flows from a uniform country of origin, today refugee 
flows tend to be smaller, more sporadic and have origins in a variety of separate countries. 
What follows next is a scholarly literature review of the field of refugee studies up 
to the present. The review will include basic scholarship on the definitional challenges of 
the field and issues regarding its scope. This review will also lay out various arguments 
about the causation contributing to the emergence of refugee flows. Finally, it will cover 
analytical models created to evaluate the policy responses of potential host countries. As 
a whole, these models are extrapolated largely from past refugee crises and applied in the 
abstract. 
 8 
CHAPTER 1: ASSESSING THE FIELD OF REFUGEE STUDIES 
 
Current refugee and refugee policy literature is grounded in the United Nations 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the UNHCR mandate. As Richard 
Black notes in his comprehensive review, the field of “refugee studies” has expanded and 
grown significantly in the second half of the twentieth century. This academic expansion 
has directly coincided with the global emergence of the phenomenon of forced migration 
and an increase in the total number of refugees. Within the past fifty years, academic 
attention to refugee studies has increased and at the same time become more 
institutionalized. This growth in the field of refugee studies has paralleled a growth in the 
numbers of refugees and forced migrants over the same period.1   
 The process of institutionalization of the field of refugee studies began with the 
introduction of the Convention in 1951 and the later Protocol in 1967. On an international 
scale, this process has included the establishment of specialized research centers, 
international research organizations and the foundation of academic journals, all 
dedicated specifically to refugee studies. The field of refugee studies is intrinsically 
connected to the emergence of specific refugee policy regimes; as such, its expansion and 
institutionalization has largely paralleled specific policy development.2 A growth in 
scholarly output and a concurrent increase in centers for refugee studies have been 
                                                      
1 Richard Black, “50 Years of Refugee Studies: From Theory to Policy,” International Migration Review 
35, no. 1, Special Issue: UNHCR at 50: Past, Present and Future of Refugee Assistance (Spring 2001): 57. 
2 Ibid., 57-8. 
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connected to policymakers. Often times, refugee research is policy-oriented research, 
completed in an institutional context. The production and dissemination of empirical 
evidence through policy organizations has been instrumental in expanding the field of 
refugee studies. The increase in output of academic literature has been based largely on 
the newly documented examples of specific displacement and humanitarian crises. The 
real increase in the number of global refugees has been one of the major contributing 
factors to the recent explosion in the field of refugee studies. The relationship between 
research and policy has developed a dialogue between policy practitioners who follow a 
problem-centered approach.3 
Perhaps for this reason, academics in the discipline of refugee studies have 
consciously sought to remain a part of mainstream academia. Many in the refugee studies 
field perform research outside of an institutional context that requires specialization in 
refugee or migration studies. In fact, most current scholarly literature on refugees exists 
not only in specialist journals devoted only to refugee studies but also in broad, 
interdisciplinary policy studies journals. Many specifically refugee-oriented institutions 
do exist. The Journal of Refugee Studies, founded in 1988, is one example of a major 
interdisciplinary journal that focuses specifically on refugee studies. This journal and 
others, such as the International Migration Review, provide an important “focus for 
scholarly output” within the field of refugee studies. For such a newly emerging field, 
practitioners believe it is important to cultivate a broad academic discourse and maintain 
                                                      
3 Ibid., 65-7. 
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the scholarly presence of refugee studies across disciplines.4 To prevent the field of 
refugee studies from becoming too obscure or highly specialized, practitioners should 
apply their research to the fields of sociology, political science, history, as well as ethics 
and even religion.  
The field of refugee studies must be more clearly defined if it is to progress as a 
distinct field of study. Language and terminology used within a field of study plays an 
important role in defining the scope that the field encompasses. Defining refugee studies 
is problematic because of various terminological difficulties and ambiguities. The 
question of what constitutes a “refugee” has both academic and practical implications. 
The United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted in 1951, 
provides the fundamental definition of who is a refugee. The Convention defines a 
refugee as:  
…a person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; 
has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is 
unable or unwilling to avail him—or herself—of the protection of that country, or 
to return there, for fear of persecution.5  
 
By nature, a definition must be specific. However, defining a refugee only by the 1951 
Convention definition has the potential to lead to a definition rooted in too particular a 
context. In general, acceptance of the legal, policy-based definition of refugee prevails in 
the global refugee discussion. Although the question of what constitutes a refugee exists, 
there has been relatively little academic literature based on conceptualizing or theorizing 
                                                      
4 Ibid., 61-2. 
5 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
(Geneva, Switzerland: 1954): 14-6.  
 11 
what constitutes a refugee or what constitutes the field of refugee studies.6  
 However, some literature argues for the extension and expansion of the definition 
of “refugee” to include other types of forced migrants. Scholars argue that definitions and 
classification of different peoples establish legal differences for essentially similar human 
conditions. The popular conception and application of the term “refugee” is generally 
more expansive than the legal definition. Many individuals labeled as refugees by the 
public have difficulty proving the necessary “well-founded fear” and terms required by 
the legal definition. The popular view tends to include almost all individuals who have 
crossed a border because of dangers in their home country, independent of the nature of 
the danger. Although civil war and domestic disturbance do not serve as a complete basis 
for designation as a refugee, the public repeatedly calls those who have fled civil war 
“refugees.” Proving broader than the legal definition, the social understanding of the 
definition of what defines a refugee includes those who flee their country of origin out of 
fear, irrespective of the Convention’s five grounds.7 
Due to the specific requirements of the legal “refugee” designation, there exist 
other specific terms and more generalized categories to define different types of forced 
migrants. For example, scholars have focused increased attention on the term “internally 
displaced persons” (IDPs) to describe marginalized, alienated and persecuted populations. 
This effort to broaden the definition of what constitutes a refugee consequently extends 
                                                      
6 Black, 63-5. 
7 David A. Martin. “A New Era for U.S. Refugee Resettlement.” SSRN eLibrary (n.d.). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=766384: 12. 
 12 
the boundaries of refugee studies to encompass a broader field of forced migration.8  
 
Analytical Lenses 
Within the field of refugee studies, much of the research seeks to assess the 
impact of the field’s scholarship on actual policy. While it is difficult to establish a causal 
link between research and changes in policy, there do exist concrete analytical 
frameworks by which refugee policy can be examined.9 Sarah Deardorff Miller 
introduces and defines two contemporary lenses through which global refugee policy can 
be analyzed. Like Black, Miller emphasizes that one’s understanding of global refugee 
policy is highly contingent upon ontological assumptions and the way in which 
disciplinary lenses are applied.10 
Miller defines the first approach as a combination of political science and 
international relations. By this lens, academics focus on how states, transnational 
networks, and national and international organizations and institutions interact with and 
put into practice global refugee policy. By this analytical framework, the state is the main 
object of study. This approach takes an empirical look at how policy is created and how 
and where it functions. This approach emphasizes that the world is increasingly 
globalized and interdependent. As such, the political science and international relations 
lens highlights the fact that global refugee policy is not just a domestic or national issue 
                                                      
8 Black, 63-4. 
9 Ibid., 70. 
10 Sarah Deardorff Miller. “Global Refugee Policy: Varying Perspectives, Unanswered Questions.” 
Refugee Studies Centre (September 2012): 1. 
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but instead a global and international issue that crosses state boundaries.11 
This approach provides a contrast to the anthropological and sociological lens. By 
this second approach, the nature of refugee policy itself is questioned. This approach 
seeks to analyze how policy is used, especially with regards to power, authority and 
control of government vis-à-vis the individual. Through this lens, specific themes of 
power and authority, as well as discourse and rhetoric, are used to analyze the concept 
and usage of the terms “policy” and “global policy.” By this approach, it is important to 
conceptualize what exactly constitutes “global refugee policy.” Policy is considered an 
instrument of governance that is created with a specific function. Forced migration 
literature written from this analytical perspective examines how language, discourse and 
power relations affect refugee policy.12 
By taking an anthropological perspective on policy, this lens focuses on the 
relationship between the individual, the society and the government. This approach 
espouses a critical approach to policy, regarding refugee policies as the tools of state 
officials used to categorize, limit, label and control refugees. When policy is considered 
as a function of top-down regulation, it can be analyzed to pinpoint reasons why it does 
not always perform its intended function. At the core, refugee policy issues are so 
difficult because they are an attempt to solve the problems of individuals on societal, 
governmental and international levels. Due to the difficulty this presents, the current 
trend is to use prima facie group determination of refugee status on the basis of the 
circumstances the country of origin, instead of determining refugee status by individual 
                                                      
11 Ibid., 2. 
12 Ibid., 2-4. 
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review.13  
Considering these two analytical frameworks, Black would assert that the political 
science and international relations approach is more prevalent in refugee literature. The 
conceptualizing and theorizing that is important by the anthropological and sociological 
perspective may be lacking. Miller also suggests that gaps in refugee policy literature still 
exist. For instance, she claims that academics must question whether the existence of 
global governance in a global world is necessarily a given. This poses the question of 
whether increased globalization and interdependence must lead to a uniform international 
or supranational refugee policy.14   
With regards to terminology, Miller poses the question of whether “policy” or 
“norms” is the more appropriate and advantageous term to use when discussing solutions 
and standards of the international refugee regime. On a similar note, Miller suggests that 
the core of global refugee policy has yet to be defined. In order for the concepts to be 
globally viable, both the field of refugee studies and the idea of a global refugee policy 
must be better defined. Both ontologically and normatively, for a global refugee policy to 
exist it must become clear whether migration management, refugee rights, refugee 
protection, or another key component will form its core. Miller suggests that a better 
understanding of what global refugee policy should entail by scholars and policymakers 
will allow states and organizations to respond by devising better policies. Refugees 
themselves will benefit from a more well-defined and well-understood notion of global 
                                                      
13 Harto Hakovirta. “The Global Refugee Problem: A Model and Its Application.” International Political 
Science Review / Revue Internationale De Science Politique 14, no. 1 (January 1, 1993): 35. 
14 Miller, 6. 
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refugee policy, as the development of the field of refugee studies has important 
implications on human lives.15 
 
Refugee Flow Creation 
The ongoing and substantial increase in refugee populations begs the question of 
how these refugee flows are created. Refugee flows, also called “refugee streams,” arise 
in “refugee situations.” A refugee stream is composed of a certain number of refugees 
who flee to one or more similar asylum countries over the course of a certain period of 
time. The presence of refugee flows causes a “refugee situation,” which occurs as a result 
of refugee streams that manifest in the form of various degrees of human, societal, 
governmental and international difficulties. As a rule, refugee flows are most often 
caused by conflict situations. Conflict situations can be defined as “situations in which 
violence and/or persecution is used for the attainment of political goals, or where there is 
an immediate threat of violence or persecution due to societal turmoil or lack of law and 
order.”16 
Scholars also assert that refugee flows are produced by the nature of the 
international political system. According to Charles Keely, refugee flows are created by 
the geopolitical nature of international politics. The nation-state is thus the source of 
refugee flows.17 Hakovirta concurs that conflict situations may arise between states, 
between opposed political forces within a state, or between a government and its 
                                                      
15 Ibid., 6-7. 
16 Hakovirta, 38-9.  
17 Charles B. Keely. “How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows.” International Migration 
Review 30, no. 4 (December 1, 1996): 1046. 
 16 
unorganized opposition. So, the root causes of violence and repression that give rise to 
refugee outflows are, in the majority of cases, governmental instability, poverty, societal 
and regional divisions, as well as power considerations.18 Scholars have identified various 
factors within the international system that cause refugee flows. 
By Keely’s model, a nation-state will create forced migration flows for three 
reasons. First, the nation-state contains more than one nation. Second, the population 
within the nation-state disagrees about the structure of the state or the economy. Third, 
the state implodes due to lack of resources.19 Hakovirta notes that in each situation, there 
exists a positive correlation between refugeeism and repression. So, repression in either 
of these situations is a prediction of possible refugee flows.20 
When the ethnic and the territorial nation are not aligned, tension within the 
nation-state occurs. The ethnic nation can be defined as a community based on descent; 
the ethnic nation is essentially a nation in search of a state. The territorial nation is 
instead a fusion of regional groups that have been brought together under an overarching 
identity by a central governmental power. Typically, physical territory is an integral part 
of nationality. However, the occurrence of incongruity between the territorial and the 
ethnic nation is a central cause of refugee flows. In most cases, the nation requires a state 
in order to provide and preserve internal order, as well as to preserve and defend the 
nation externally. In the contemporary geopolitical system, “statelessness is normatively 
deviant.” Stateless peoples such as refugees, who fall outside of the protection of the state, 
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are thus deviant and threaten geopolitics based on the nation-state.  Ideally, each state 
should contain one nation so that a government supports a unified collective interest. The 
existence of multinational states demonstrates the difference between the normative ideal 
and the reality of the modern system. Keely calls this distinction the nation-state norm 
versus the multinational reality 21  
The multinational state represents the first possible source of refugee flows. Due 
to the frequent difference between ethnic and territorial nations, the nation-state must 
attempt to reconcile the nation-state norm with political reality. The nation-state will do 
this by a) attempting to develop a supranational identity distinct from any constituent 
nation, b) creating a national identity based on one dominant group to which other groups 
are forced to conform, c) forging confederation agreements to institutionalize national 
differences, or d) developing a program of ethnic cleansing to achieve ethnic 
homogeneity and a single national identity. In this fourth scenario, refugee flows emerge 
as a result of state-sponsored population transfers, expulsion, or genocide as a way to 
reconcile a multitude of identities.22  
In extreme cases, the state may pursue an ethnic purification policy that 
culminates in genocide. At times, strong separatist or autonomist movements challenge 
the political and economic domination by hegemonic ethnocracies.23 In fact, many of the 
most urgent and longest-lasting refugee crises have originated from ethnic and religious 
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cleavages, as well as regional inequalities and differences within a nation.24 Although the 
last manner of nation-state formation is most outwardly violent, all four methods contain 
the inherent possibility of conflict. Each case requires the destruction or suppression of 
the national identities of at least some citizens. During the process of nation-building or 
during times of transition, a nation-state that attempts to manage or actively change its 
multinational dynamic is likely to become the source of refugee flows.25  
The second possible source of refugee flows comes from a diversity of ideologies. 
Ideological disagreement or revolution shows the unfixed nature of state institutions. 
When the political or socioeconomic structures of the state undergo changes due to 
internal ideological unrest, the creation of refugee flows is a possible and probable result. 
Social transformation and revolution, from either the left or the right, usually 
accompanies violence and displacement.26  
The third possible source of refugee flows is the implosion of the state. By 
definition, “state implosion” occurs when there is no sitting government in control, no 
operating justice system, a failing infrastructure without the resources to repair it, and the 
lack of banking and monetary systems. When a state implodes, migration almost always 
occurs. These migrants become categorized as refugees if they come to fear persecution 
or death by rival groups seeking to establish political power. Hakovirta notes that as 
violence and repression are correlated with the production of refugee flows, so too does 
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the ceasing of a refugee flow coincide with the ending of a repressive conflict.27Although 
distinct, these three conflict scenarios can occur simultaneously and exacerbate the 
production of refugee flows.28 
The aforementioned analytical lenses and identifiable factors affecting refugee 
creation and subsequent policy responses are all contained under the umbrella of recent 
refugee studies scholarship. By providing two multi-faceted analytical frameworks, 
scholars like Miller permit concrete analysis of refugee crises at different levels of 
governance. It is important to recognize for the forthcoming argument that the factors 
outlined by Keely and others were present in Iraq and contributed to the creation of a 
prolonged refugee crisis. Although this paper will focus specifically on the policy 
response of the United States to this crisis, it is important to take note of tendencies 
displayed internationally in addition to national tendencies. Essentially, such a global 
problem warrants a look at the global response. Over time, changes in refugee patterns 
have paralleled changes in policy responses. These changes, as well as the variety of 
interpretations of the Convention and Protocol, call into question the existence of a truly 
uniform international refugee regime. 
 
Change in Refugee Patterns Over Time 
The main source of refugee flows has evolved over time. After World War I, the 
original international refugee regime that emerged with the League of Nations sought to 
arrange internationally coordinated protection and assistance to displaced people. At this 
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time, population transfers were related to the end of European empires. Major flows were 
caused as people fled from states that could no longer protect their citizens. Directly after 
World War II, international attention shifted its focus to refugees from Nazi Germany and 
other minorities. Relief efforts focused on the repatriation of these refugees within 
Europe, and later on overseas resettlement after the descent of the Iron Curtain. In the 
1950s, the focus of humanitarian efforts for refugees shifted to the Third World, as it 
became the source of the majority of refugees. Conflict situations brought about by civil 
wars and ideological revolutions that emerged during post-colonial state building created 
high-volume refugee flows. As superpowers began to withdraw support from Third 
World countries at the end of the Cold War, these states became further weakened to the 
point of implosion, creating additional refugees.29  
During the latter half of the 1970s, both the number of refugees as well as the 
level of international response increased dramatically. Between 1979 and 1980, the 
number of refugees worldwide doubled; the financial resources received by UNHCR 
from signatory nations quadrupled. Although the increase in funding was positive, this 
disproportional growth demonstrated that the cost per refugee had begun to far outpace 
the increase in refugee numbers; more money was needed to assist fewer refugees. At this 
time, the growth in costs was largely due to resettlement programs for Indochinese 
refugees. By the end of the 1980s, the rapid-development phase proved to be transitory. 
From the 1980s on, spending levels by UNHCR remained the same or below the level 
reached in 1980, even as the number of refugees globally continued to increase. This 
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means that the amount spent per refugee has been constantly decreasing.30 Hakovirta 
defines this difference between international response and the causes of refugee crises as 
a “crisis gap.” In this way, one major problem that has contributed to the continuity of the 
global refugee crisis is the inability of UNHCR and individual nations to coordinate a 
sufficient international response to individual refugee crises.31  
According to Keely, the international cause of refugee flows has always been 
based on the nation-state system. This is precisely because large, uncontrolled 
movements of peoples beyond their state borders threaten international stability. Thus, 
the political basis for the international refugee regime is protection of the state and the 
international system of states. By this model, refugees represent a “system-induced threat” 
to international equilibrium. In order to restore order to the system, the “preferred durable 
solution” is the process of repatriation as an “attempt to regain normalcy.”32 Like the 
process of refugee flow formation, refugee policies have also evolved over time. During 
the Cold War, refugee policy focused mainly on resettling the “victims” of communism; 
in fact, resettlement and asylum policy in the West favored applicants from communist 
countries. This represented a distortion of the refugee regime, because anticommunist 
policy encouraged refugee admissions as a way to disparage totalitarian countries. In the 
1990s, UNHCR’s focus was also on repatriation. Keely identifies a dual standard in the 
treatment of anticommunist refugees and Third World refugees, who are more likely to 
                                                      
30 Hakovirta, 48. In constant prices, only between 1989 and 1990 did the sums spent by UNHCR exceed the 
level reached in 1980. 
31 Ibid., 49.  
32 Keely, 1057-8. 
 22 
face repatriation.33 
Due to the stateless status of refugees, a fundamental mandate of UNHCR is to 
provide state-like protection to refugees. This protection mandate includes the security of 
person and property, the exercise of the right to worship, marry and perform normal life 
activities, and the general preventative action against large-scale human rights violations. 
Human rights violations are often major causes of refugee flows. For this reason, 
UNHCR seeks to identify “early warning” signs of potential refugee flows.34 The 
UNHCR mandate is fundamentally given by states. Therefore, states define its scope and 
operation by interpreting the mandates through authoritative and positive actions. States 
want to maintain the UNHCR mandate because refugees pose a destabilizing threat to the 
state system itself. This fact is especially important in the context of this paper. Refugee 
policy and response to migration flows must be analyzed on a state-by-state basis because 
states are the political bodies that interpret and act out UNHCR mandates.35   
J. Craig Jenkins and Susanne Schmeidl label the refugee situation today as a 
“global refugee crisis.” First, the problem is global because the refugee flows have 
become so large that they can only be addressed and remedied at a world level. This 
means that international institutions and non-governmental organizations are fundamental 
in humanitarian assistance and humanitarian intervention for conflict resolution. Even as 
the problem must be solved at a global level, the roots of the refugee crisis lie in the 
structure of the international system. Conflict over refugee policy is essentially rooted in 
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international inequality between nations of the world economy. On one hand, refugees 
often emerge from nations where internal or domestic problems are caused by inequality, 
repressive governments and ethnic hostilities. The larger issues of global inequality and 
interstate interaction are also part of the refugee problem. Political violence derived from 
inequality is generally the basis for the global refugee crisis. This includes instances of 
civil war, severe state repression and international war.36  
 
Factors Affecting Refugee Policy 
As the refugee crisis has become more globalized, scholars have been able to use 
data from past refugee crises to identify the factors affecting refugee policy once a crisis 
emerges. Generally, scholars tend to agree on the principal variables at play that affect 
refugee policy. However, scholars vary in their division of the general variables into 
more specific factors. The four broadest variables that encompass more specific factors 
include a cost-benefit analysis on an international level, diplomatic relations with the 
sending country, analysis of the absorptive capacity of the prospective host country as 
determined by economic conditions, and national security considerations of the host 
country. Depending on the cause of the refugee crisis and the state of the political climate, 
certain factors become more important in predicting and explaining the policy responses 
of individual nations.  
The first response to refugee crises occurs on both an international and national 
level.  Scholars suggest that the internationalization of a specific refugee crisis (as well as 
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the global refugee crisis as a whole, historically) depends on the following factors: the 
seriousness of the refugee crisis itself, the nature of the underlying conflicts causing the 
refugee crisis, and the efforts undertaken by the state and other actors to manage and 
solve the issue. Even as these factors affect the process of internationalization of the 
response to a refugee crisis, the subsequent internationalization of a response influences 
these original factors in return.37 
Once refugee flows emerge, governments face choices about how to respond to 
this population influx. First, a “refugee influx” is defined as “that which occurs when, 
within a relatively short period (a few years), large numbers (thousands) of people flee 
their places of residence for the asylum country.” Essentially, an influx is a group of 
people who flee their country en masse. A host government has three clear choices when 
it comes to accepting refugees. It can a) do nothing; b) respond negatively; or c) respond 
positively. A host government can evaluate refugee policy choices along a spectrum 
based on United Nations protocols and recommendations: from perfect compliance to 
noncompliance.38   
Beneath the umbrella of generally accepted policy variables, Karen Jacobsen 
identifies four major factors that influence the policy response of individual host 
governments and influence the formation of a state’s refugee policy in the face of a 
refugee influx. Jacobsen presents the following specific factors: costs and benefits of 
accepting international assistance, relations with the sending country, political 
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calculations about the local community’s absorption capacity, and national security 
considerations. The nature of these factors means that less developed countries often 
practice different responses with regards to asylum than those of industrialized Western 
countries. This is precisely because diverse economic, political and military 
considerations shape their responses.39 
The first factor that influences a host country’s response is the cost-benefit 
analysis of accepting international assistance. The cost and benefit analysis is largely tied 
to bureaucratic choices. Bureaucratic choices deeply affect refugee policy. For instance, 
prior legal and bureaucratic decisions affect subsequent refugee policy decisions; thus 
policy outputs become subsequent policy inputs.40 Often times, the decision to allocate 
refugee responsibility to a civilian state agency means that agency has a vested interest in 
refugees and will set a more positive policy. If refugee policy is not allocated to a 
separate agency, refugees can be seen as a burden or even a threat to national security.41 
Part of this cost-benefit analysis, executed at the national level, is an analysis of 
the various players that shape bureaucratic decisions and actions. Gary J. Miller outlines 
the traditional principal-agent theory (PAT), a modeling technique that addresses the 
information asymmetry and resulting system of incentives in political relationships 
relevant to this case. PAT assumes that the agent has an informational advantage over the 
principal, although the principal has formal authority in the relationship. In PAT, the 
principal’s authority to impose incentives on the agent is most important. Even at an 
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informational disadvantage, the principal can maintain leverage against the agent. The 
principal seeks to manipulate the agent’s incentives in order to minimize “shirking,” 
which is defined as the total loss imposed on the principal by an inability to align the 
agent’s self-interest with that of the principal.42  
In the United States, the president has the role of the agent, and Congress plays 
the role of the principal. Case study research has shown that despite low levels of 
congressional monitoring of the president, Congress still exercises a level of control over 
the executive. This suggests that bureaucrats are adequately motivated by incentives to 
act in the best interest of Congress, even in the absence of strict monitoring procedures.  
Miller asserts that congressional oversight of the bureaucracy has placed increasing 
emphasis on the negotiation of administrative procedures, instead of the imposition of 
outcome-based incentives on the agent.43 Citing an earlier paper by BR Weingast, Miller 
explains the precise nature of the incentives provided to bureaucrats and the executive by 
congressional committees: bureaucratic competition for (ultimately) limited budgetary 
appropriations, congressional influence over the appointment of top bureaucratic officials, 
and the threat of ex post sanctions in the form of congressional hearings and 
investigations.44 
The second factor can be defined as a combination of international relations and 
global politics considerations that affect diplomatic relationships between the sending 
country and the host country. On a practical level, the international refugee regime 
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provides financial assistance to support refugee resettlement, and UNHCR sets standards 
that states must follow. Normatively, the threat of bad publicity on an international stage 
can lead to more generous refugee policies. In some cases, the host government still may 
have leverage over international institutions within its borders. Relations with the sending 
country, whether friendly or hostile, also play a large role in determining a state’s 
response to refugee flows. Asylum policies are accorded to applicants by their countries 
of origin, demonstrating that relations between host country and sending country affects 
policy.45 
The third factor affecting policy is political calculations about the local 
community’s absorption capacity, as determined by economic conditions. Policy is thus 
concerned with the admission and treatment of refugees, durable solutions of repatriation, 
and local integration or resettlement in a host country. The local absorption capacity can 
be defined as the extent to which a community is willing and able to absorb an influx of 
refugees. On one hand, absorption capacity is based on the structural ability of a 
community to absorb large numbers of refugees, taking into account economic capacity 
and international assistance.46  Economic conditions are a major determinant for a 
receiving country’s migration policy. Economic capacity takes into account land 
availability, the carrying capacity of land, employment rates, and the strength of local 
infrastructure.  On the other hand, absorption capacity can be measured by the 
willingness of a community to accept the refugees. This capacity is based on local beliefs 
and attitudes about refugees and a general perception of the community’s ability to 
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absorb refugees.47 This can also be called social receptiveness, which determines the 
cultural meaning of “refugees” in a community. Often times, the way in which a 
receiving community perceives refugees and thus how it responds to them is based on 
historical, cultural and religious factors. Cultural factors such as ethnic affinity and the 
belief that refugees are “deserving” of asylum foster more sympathy for refugees. This is 
especially important in democratic countries where governments are constrained by 
accountability to the public. A strong linkage between a state and civil society means that 
civil society influences policymaking.48 
The final element that Jacobsen identifies that comes into play is national security 
consideration. National security can encompass both environmental and socioeconomic 
security. In different instances, refugees themselves may be real or perceived threats to 
the host country. The presence of an actual or perceived security threat affects policy 
negatively: police and immigration officials become less likely to admit asylum seekers 
and more likely to expel existing refugees.49 Wayne A. Cornelius and Marc Rosenblum 
also concur that diplomatic or security considerations can shape immigration policy 
generally, and in turn, refugee policy.50 
Marc Rosenblum and Idean Salehyan, in a second article, assert that the four 
major factors that affect refugee policy act as a combination of both normative and 
national interest considerations. By their theoretical framework, normative and strategic 
goals are not mutually exclusive; in fact, normative and strategic goals can complement 
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or conflict in an interaction that determines state policy. For analytical purposes, however, 
Rosenblum and Salehyan point out that normative and instrumental goals can be 
analytically separated.51 From their previous studies, Rosenblum and Salehyan have 
concluded that refugee and asylum policy is predominantly humanitarian based. By this 
analytical framework, states thus make refugee and asylum decisions based on norms and 
interests.52 This argument may serve to predict which factor plays the most predominant 
role in shaping a refugee policy response.  
Despite the definition of the general variables and specific factors that affect 
policy responses to a refugee crisis, there is no way to perfectly predict how a nation will 
respond. Over the past twenty years, coupled with an increase in global refugee flows, 
states have closed their borders to refugee influxes many times. Usually, states close their 
borders in order to preserve security and to relieve pressure on national capacity and 
capability to receive the refugees. Despite these economic or practical factors, border 
closures have become increasingly political. The ability to control state borders is a 
fundamental expression of state sovereignty that is equated with political power and 
identity. By determining who may enter a state’s territory, a state can determine its social 
and economic make-up. In this way, when a state offers asylum to asylum-seekers and 
grants refugee status to certain individuals, this obligation may directly conflict with or 
contradict state sovereignty, especially if the refugee influx may threaten the security of 
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the nation-state.53 
Thus, the theory and practice of border policy stand in opposition. Despite the 
willingness of states to allow asylum-seekers to remain within their borders, significant 
obstacles stand in the way. These obstacles are largely based in realism: the power and 
importance of national sovereignty. This can be included in what Rosenblum and 
Salehyan call the “norms-versus-interests debate.” In this case, the debate centers on 
whether humanitarian norms or strategic considerations can and do effect asylum and 
refugee policy. Humanitarianism, in this case, can be defined as the “principle that there 
is a duty incumbent upon each and every individual to assist those in great distress or 
suffering when the costs of doing so are low.”54 On one hand, realists and traditional 
liberals contend that states are rational actors that seek to maximize tangible benefits. On 
the other hand, constructivists argue that the emergence of international norms and the 
internalization of these norms take precedent over instrumental calculations.55  
UNHCR operates by its own set of normative and strategic calculations. 
Traditionally, the norm of non- intervention has taken precedence over the option for 
intervention as a strategy to mitigate refugee flows. Although intervention can risk 
significant conflict escalation and international instability, an interventionist approach by 
UNHCR risks the rejection by countries of origin (largely in the Third World) as well 
push-back from main donor states. For these reasons, current UNHCR policy focuses on 
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identifying the root causes of refugee crises, as outlined here.56 The general scholarship 
on refugee flows is comprehensive in defining the factors influencing the creation of 
refugee flows and the decisions by host states to accept refugees. These points will be 
important in the chapters to follow as the response of the United States to the Iraqi 
refugee crisis is analyzed.  
 
Proposal 
After looking critically at the existing literature, one can conclude that the Iraqi 
refugee crisis can be analyzed using the factors describing refugee formation as well as 
the policy response of host countries. Keely’s assertion that refugee crises are brought 
about by the geopolitical nature of the international political system holds, as does 
Hakovirta’s notion that the nation-state serves as the source of forced migration. More 
specifically, Keely’s suggestion that a multiethnic, multi-religious state can provoke and 
exacerbate a refugee crisis holds for Iraq; Iraq is a multi-ethnic state. Divisions between 
Sunni and Shia Iraqis, coupled with distinct geographical divisions between North and 
South Iraq, produced the tension between the nation-state norm and the multinational 
reality.57 Between February 2006 and November 2007, the registered IDPs in Iraq were 
self-identified as 63% Shia and 32% Sunni. According to the Iraqi Ministry for Migration 
and Displacement, almost half of Iraq’s non-Muslim minorities had fled abroad by 
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2008.58 Ethnic, religious and regional differences in Iraqi contributed to the dissonance 
and disorganization during the Iraq War. 
Although a distinct difference in ideologies did not heavily contribute to the 
creation of Iraqi refugee flows, the implosion of the Iraqi state served as a major 
exaggerating factor after the invasion of the United States in 2003. The characteristics of 
state implosion, including civil strife, a lack of sitting government, no operating justice 
system, and a failing infrastructure, were all present and contributing factors to the 
refugee crisis. State implosion in this case caused forced internal migration and external 
migration. As both Hakovirta and Keely note, the Iraqi state was not the only state to 
contribute to the Iraqi refugee crisis. These two scholars agree that conflict situations may 
arise within a state but also between states. In this case, the initial act that preceded the 
refugee crisis was the invasion of Iraq by the United States in 2003. According to 
UNHCR, prior to invasion of Iraq there existed 1,021,963 IDPs living in Iraq. Between 
2003 and 2005, following the invasion by the United States, the number of IDPs in Iraq 
rose by 190,146 persons. The number of IDPs rose significantly in February 2006 after 
the bombings in Samarra, which provoked unprecedented retaliatory sectarian violence.59 
The lack of stable infrastructure, in combination with the Iraqi insurgency brought on by 
the Iraq War, contributed to the refugee crisis. Keely’s framework for the creation of a 
refugee crisis thus successfully and concretely explains the emergence of a refugee crisis 
in Iraq. 
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The analytical models presented above can also be applied to the resulting refugee 
policy response. Jacobsen’s model of factors affecting a nation’s policy response is 
applicable in this case to the response of the United States to the Iraqi refugee crisis. 
Jacobsen’s first factor, costs and benefits of accepting international assistance, played a 
role in the US response by affecting bureaucratic and congressional actions. Specifically, 
the principal-agent theory and model can be used to analyze the US policy response. In 
this case, the division of responsibility and decision-making ability between the 
legislative and executive branches of the US government meant that initial responses to 
the refugee crisis were inconsistent and based on variable motivations. However, the 
power of the principal eventually played a role in policy change via a system of 
incentives and sanctions established by congressional hearings.  
The second factor, diplomatic relations with the sending country, played a larger 
role in the US response. Regardless of US intentions, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the 
establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority clearly exacerbated the hostile 
relationship between the United States and the government of Saddam Hussein. Even 
after the transfer of power to the Interim Iraqi Government and the reestablishment of 
diplomatic relations in 2004, the continuous presence of US troops kept official relations 
strained.60 
In comparison, Jacobsen’s third factor played little to no role in the US policy 
response to Iraqi refugees. Political calculations about the local community’s absorption 
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capacity is not highly relevant in the case of the United States, given the extensive 
resources of the US Refugee Admissions Program.61 
Jacobsen’s fourth factor, national security considerations, played a relevant role in 
the initial policy response of the United States. Directly after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the United States halted the active processing of Iraqi refugee cases 
and banned all refugees from entering the United States while security procedures were 
reviewed. The consequent procedural changes resulted in an enhanced security review 
process and heightened security measures.62 Put into place to prevent terrorists from 
entering the country, this enhanced security review made it incredibly difficult for Iraqi 
refugees referred to the United States by UNHCR to pass through the screening process.63 
In this case, steps taken to enhance national security directly resulted in a lower number 
of Iraqi refugee admissions.64 
By using these two frameworks to discuss the factors influencing the production 
of the Iraqi refugee crisis as well as the policy response of the United States to the crisis, 
this paper will identify the unique factors that contributed to US policy. After considering 
the policy response of the United States and its political reaction to the Iraqi refugee 
crisis, one can determine whether the policy response follows a specific pattern of action 
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or operates on a more ad hoc basis. The initial response of the US government with 
regards to Iraqi refugees aligns most directly to the national self-interest approach to a 
refugee program. Over time, pressure from Congress, international organizations, as well 
as an increasing feeling of responsibility shifted the strategy to a partially humanitarian 
approach. The system of incentives created by the principal-agent model describing 
Congress and the executive can account for the eventual imposition of congressional 
hearings and committees, which served to assert certain ex post sanctions and to break 
down part of the informational asymmetry. This represented a reassertion of the formal 
authority of the principal over the agent in the form of a more complete refugee policy 
and increased appropriations.   
In this paper, the creation and extent of the Iraqi refugee crisis is analyzed, 
including its origins in the Iraqi War and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The creation of 
the Iraqi refugee crisis will be analyzed using the factors outlined above that contribute to 
the production of refugee flows. Once the emergence of the Iraqi refugee crisis has been 
established, this paper will examine the historical development of the refugee policies of 
the United States. Using these existing policies as a background, this paper will then 
analyze the individual policy response of the United States to determine how its refugee 
policy was affected by the emergence of the Iraqi refugee crisis. By using aforementioned 
factors affecting a nation’s policy response to refugee flows, this paper will examine the 
motivating factors behind each specific response. Finally, the last section of the paper 
will examine the role of ethics and obligation as possible factors contributing to a policy 
response. These factors will be analyzed in conjunction with an analysis of the efficacy of 
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the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the extent to which 
the United States conforms to international norms in their policy responses.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE IRAQ WAR AND ITS REFUGEES 
 
The Iraq War 
 
The Iraq War began in 2003, initiated by an invasion by the United States and the 
United Kingdom. The roots of the war, as well as the causes and motivation behind the 
invasion, rested largely on Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) and the resulting threat posed by such a heavily armed Iraq. The history of the 
United States-Iraq conflict dates back to the Gulf War. At the war’s conclusion, the UN 
prohibited Iraq from producing and possessing WMD, and it required Iraq to submit to 
additional inspections to confirm its compliance. This prohibition was formally stated in 
UN Resolution 687, passed on April 3, 1991, which conditionally ended the Gulf War. It 
stipulated that Iraq destroy its chemical and biological weapons, as well as its long-range 
ballistic missiles. Iraq agreed not to develop nuclear weapons and to submit to on-site 
inspections and reports.  
At the beginning of 2002, President George W. Bush identified Iraq, along with 
Iran and North Korea, as an “axis of evil” in his State of the Union Address. In May of 
that year, the UN Security Council (UNSC) decided to reevaluate and change its 11-year-
old sanctions against Iraq, then under the control of Saddam Hussein. The UN introduced 
“smart sanctions” that were targeted at military equipment and required Iraq to cooperate 
with UN inspectors, in order to ensure that it did not possess WMD. After negotiations 
between the UN and Iraq began to deteriorate in July 2002, Iraq sought to invite Hans 
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Blix, the UN chief weapons inspector, to Baghdad, as a step towards compliance and a 
completed arms inspection. In September 2002, Iraq accepted the unconditional return 
and presence of UN inspectors.1  
On October 16, an official referendum gave Saddam Hussein an additional seven-
year term as Iraq’s president, after he received 100 per cent of the vote. At this point, 
both the United States and the United Kingdom had publicly declared their belief that 
Iraq posed a global security threat. President Bush appealed to the UN General Assembly, 
stating that Iraq posed a “grave and gathering danger” that had to be confronted 
immediately. On the other hand, the United Kingdom also published what became known 
as the “45 minute claim,” stating that Saddam Hussein did in fact possess WMD that 
could be activated within 45 minutes of his order. 2 Released on the morning of the 
Tuesday, 24 September 2002 House of Commons debate, this report embodied claims 
and judgments of Britain’s intelligence services as to the nature of Iraq’s military 
capacity.3  
On November 8, the UNSC passed Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441, jointly 
drafted by the United States and the United Kingdom, required Iraq to reinstate the 
process of UN weapons inspections after a four-year absence, in order to comply with its 
previous obligation to disarm. Resolution 1441 provided Iraq a final opportunity to fully 
comply with its original resolutions, including Resolution 687. It stated that Iraq, by the 
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possession of WMD, was in material breach of that resolution. Resolution 1441 was 
accepted by Saddam Hussein on November 13, and weapons inspector Blix, now backed 
by UN Resolution 1441, returned to Baghdad shortly afterwards to look for WMD. As 
part of an additional requirement of Resolution 1441, Iraq produced a 12,000-page 
weapons declaration detailing its arsenal. The document was meant to be a full and 
current account of all chemical, biological, nuclear and missile weaponry at the time. At 
first, Blix stated that this Iraqi arms declaration contained little new information 
regarding its WMD capability.4  
However, on December 19, the United States accused Baghdad of a continued 
“material breach” of Resolution 1441. In response, Blix reported to the UNSC that 
although there remained “many unanswered questions” about Iraq’s weapons programs, 
the inspectors had not found any “smoking guns” that warranted military action. 
Ironically, on January 16, 2003, UN weapons inspectors found twelve never-before-seen 
warheads designed to carry chemical weapons. The inspectors believed that the warheads 
were not reported in Iraq’s 12,000-page submission to the UNSC. In response, the United 
States issued a statement describing the warheads as a “smoldering, not smoking gun,” 
evidence worthy of a military response.5  
After concluding the inspection, UN inspectors presented a report to the UNSC 
regarding Iraqi cooperation with Resolution 1441, as well as their search for WMD. The 
United States and the United Kingdom proceeded to seize the report, stating that it 
proved Iraqi noncompliance instead of Iraqi cooperation. In his 2003 State of the Union 
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Address, President Bush announced his plan to attack Iraq, even without an official UN 
mandate. The Chilcot Inquiry later revealed that in April 2002, Prime Minister Tony 
Blair had promised President Bush to support the United States in its attack of Iraq in 
order to overthrow Saddam Hussein, with or without a UN mandate. Additional 
documents released later demonstrated that Prime Minister Blair disagreed with the 
cautionary statement made by the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith. According to 
documents leaked after the meeting, Prime Minister Blair had confirmed to President 
Bush on January 31, 2003, that he supported US military action.6  
On February 24, the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain submitted a 
proposed resolution to the UNSC, stating Iraq had failed to comply with the final 
opportunity for cooperation that was provided by Resolution 1441. In response, the 
foreign ministers of France, Russia and Germany released a joint declaration stating that 
they would not allow a new resolution that authorized military action to pass in the 
UNSC. In March, as tension rose, France and Russia announced that they would veto a 
drafted UN resolution requiring Iraq to disarm in seven days. French President Jacques 
Chirac declared that France would vote against any resolution that contained an 
ultimatum leading to war until the weapons inspectors in Iraq confirmed this prospect as 
a last resort.7  
In direct opposition to the French, President Bush, Prime Minister Blair and the 
Spanish Premier, Jose Maria Aznar, met to discuss their proposed resolution. They set 
March 17, 2003, as a deadline for the UNSC to support the jointly proposed resolution 
                                                      
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
 41 
between the United States and the United Kingdom, which called for the immediate 
disarmament of Iraq. On that day, the British ambassador to the UN announced the 
withdrawal of the proposed resolution co-sponsored by the United States and Spain, as 
well as the termination of diplomatic processes on the topic of Iraq. In Iraq, UN arms 
inspectors evacuated; at the same time, President Bush gave Saddam Hussein 48 hours to 
leave Iraq or face war with the United States. On the British side, Lord Goldsmith, the 
Attorney General, stated that war with Iraq would be legal on the grounds of existing UN 
resolutions. On March 20, 2003, the invasion of Iraq by the United States and the United 
Kingdom began. Less than a month later, Baghdad fell to US forces.8  
After declaring a victory for the United States on May 2, President Bush 
appointed Paul Bremer as top civilian administrator in Iraq, creating a US-led 
administration to replace Saddam Hussein’s fallen regime. Bremer then proceeded to 
abolish Iraqi institutions that had served to perpetuate Saddam Hussein’s powerful hold. 
The UNSC subsequently declared its support for the new administration in Iraq, and it 
lifted its economic sanctions. In July 2003, the interim governing council was formed, 
comprised of twenty-five Iraqis appointed by the United States and the United Kingdom. 
On December 13, 2003, Saddam Hussein was captured. After his capture, talk began 
about forming the Iraqi Interim Government; however, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority opposed holding democratic elections at this time.9 
Beginning in the spring of 2004, the Iraqi resistance, made up of insurgents who 
opposed the foreign occupation, began to intensify. At this point, the Iraqi insurgents 
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began to shift their attacks towards members of the new Iraqi Security Forces, instead of 
focusing solely on the coalition forces. Iraqi civilians and police became the new targets 
of the insurgency forces. Multiple offenses led by the coalition forces became some of 
the bloodiest battles in the war. In January of 2005, the Iraqi people elected the Iraqi 
Transitional Government. After an initial lull in the fighting, suicide bombers let loose a 
violent campaign across Iraq in the wake of the elections that killed hundreds of Iraqi 
civilians.  
 
The Iraqi Refugee Crisis 
The Iraq War of 2003 was the catalyst for a refugee crisis of massive proportions. 
By Harto Hakovirta’s definition, the Iraq War can be considered a “conflict situation.” 
Defined as a situation in which violence is used for political goals and where there exists 
the risk of violence or persecution due to social turmoil and a breakdown of law and 
order, a conflict situation produces the possibility of refugee flows. The violence that 
occurred in Iraq as part of the developing conflict situation emerged as a result of the US 
invasion. The nation-state and the international state system itself can be seen as a source 
of the conflict and the consequent refugee flows. In this case, the conflict situation arose 
between states and between factions within the state of Iraq. In turn, from this conflict 
situation emerged a “refugee stream,” essentially Iraqis fleeing the violence and 
persecution in their home country. From this model, the existence of a refugee stream 
caused a refugee situation, or crisis, in which the refugee flows became manifest on a 
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national and international level.10  
By 2008, it is estimated that the refugee stream exiting Iraqi was comprised of 
more than two million Iraqi refugees, or ten per cent of the Iraqi population. These Iraqis 
fled Iraq and took refuge in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and other states that border Iraq. By 
some estimates, there were a total of approximately 4.5 million internally and externally 
displaced persons (IDPs) by 2008. Due to the difficulty with obtaining accurate and up to 
date data, the numbers of displaced and refugee-status Iraqis have changed constantly and 
vary by source. For example, Kelly O'Donnell and Kathleen Newland note that, while the 
Migration Policy Institute reported close to 4.5 million displaced Iraqis (2.2 million 
refugees and 2.3 IDPs) in a January 2008 publication, the Iraqi Red Crescent Society 
estimates of refugees and IDPs exceeded those numbers.11 Furthermore, UNHCR 
estimated in 2008 that close to 4.7 million Iraqis had been displaced from their homes, 
including roughly 2.7 million IDPs and 2 million refugees who had fled Iraq for 
neighboring Jordan and Syria.12 
According to UNHCR estimates, prior to the invasion of Iraq by the United States 
and the United Kingdom in 2003, Iraq was home to 1,021,963 IDPs. Between 2003 and 
2005, the number of IDPs in Iraq rose by 190,146 persons. Specifically, the number of 
IDPs began rising significantly in November 2006, after Saddam Hussein was sentenced 
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to death.13 As a result, it is estimated that around 1.5 million Iraqis were displaced 
between 2006 and 2007.14 Between February 2006 and November 2007, the registered 
IDPs in Iraq were self-identified as 63% Shia and 32% Sunni. According to the Iraqi 
Ministry for Migration and Displacement, almost half of Iraq’s non-Muslim minorities 
had fled abroad by 2008. By December 2007, just 4,575 Iraqis had left for third countries 
through formal resettlement programs, as opposed to informal migration streams. 
Between 2003 and 2006, a total of just 3,100 Iraqis were resettled to industrialized 
countries.15 
Over the course of 2008, less than one per cent of the Iraqi population was 
additionally displaced. On one hand, this data presents evidence of limited improvement, 
including a decrease in violence, lower levels of displacement, and a handful of returned 
Iraqis in some regions. However, the Iraqi refugee crisis remained serious and sustained; 
UNHCR estimated that the number of Iraqi IDPs who lacked food and shelter in 2008 
exceeded 1 million people. In order to temper this ongoing humanitarian crisis, experts 
began suggesting that a stronger response from the international community, including 
funds for humanitarian relief, was necessary in the future. It would also be pertinent to 
examine the resettlement policies of third countries, especially those that neighbor Iraq. 
International assistance is needed to develop a strategy to manage the IDPs within Iraq as 
well as increase funding and aid to host countries and refugees outside of Iraq.16 
Although Iraq had been a significant refugee-producing country for several 
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decades, the Iraqi displacement crisis grew on an unprecedented scale in recent years, and 
in particular since the upsurge in sectarian violence following the February 2006 Samarra 
bombings.17 According to the International Organization for Migration, the bombing of 
the Al-Askari Mosque in Samara in February 2006 triggered sectarian violence that 
significantly increased the number of displaced Iraqis. Although military operations, 
crime, and general insecurity remained factors, sectarian violence became the primary 
driver for population displacement.18 The steadily deteriorating security situation since 
the 2003 invasion made Iraq unacceptably dangerous for millions of its citizens. As 
UNHCR stated in its September 2007 eligibility guidelines on Iraqi refugees, “the present 
situation in Central and Southern Iraq is characterised by pervasive extreme violence, 
serious violations of human rights and a general lack of law and order.”19 By Charles 
Keely’s refugee model, the implosion of the Iraqi state at that time presents a plausible 
source of the subsequent refugee streams. Keely emphasizes that while implosion most 
often times causes migration, migrants become categorized as refugees if they come to 
fear persecution or death by rival groups seeking to establish political power.20 
Of the approximately 4.5 million displaced Iraqis, nearly 2 million have fled to 
neighboring countries of first asylum. These include Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, and 
Turkey. Syria is host to the largest population of Iraqis outside Iraq, with approximately 
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1.2 to 1.5 million resident Iraqis, including over 128,000 registered refugees.21 According 
to the Institute for Applied International Studies, approximately 450,000-500,000 Iraqi 
refugees are residents of Jordan.22 Lebanon is host to approximately 50,000 Iraqi refugees, 
according to UNHCR.23  
The Iraqi refugee crisis is distinct and presents unique problems for a variety of 
reasons. First of all, the most significant problem with the past and current Iraqi refugee 
situation is that the top four countries of first asylum, including Syria, Jordan and 
Lebanon, are not signatories to the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. This means that these countries have not legally 
accepted the UNHCR definition of the term “refugee,” as outlined by the convention. 
These countries have also refused to formally recognize the protection mandates 
recognized under international law.24 For this reason, these countries have not granted 
Iraqis legal refugee status and therefore treat them as temporary guests.25  
The refusal to grant legal refugee status stems largely from the fear that refugees 
will settle permanently in the country of first asylum. This means that the Iraqis are 
treated more as “temporary visitors” than those that require long-term support.26 So, Iraqi 
refugees fear deportation and thus do not take advantage of resources that should be 
available to official refugees. Despite this fact, UNHCR has expanded to operate in all of 
the major host countries. Registration with UNHCR still does not provide any legal status, 
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however, and it therefore can only informally guarantee protection against deportation.27 
On September 10, 2007, Syria issued visa restrictions limiting the entry of Iraqi 
refugees. Syria also refused to grant visas to US Department of Homeland Security 
officials seeking to screen Iraqis personally for admission to the United States Refugee 
Resettlement Program. Following pressure from the United States, Syria lifted the ban on 
November 11, 2007, but continued to deny Iraqis legal refugee status. Jordan, a second 
country that is not a signatory to the Convention, has not granted asylum to Iraqi refugees, 
nor has it given Iraqis legal refugee status. By law, Iraqis remain subject to deportation 
under these circumstances. Despite the fact that these nations are not parties to the UN 
Convention and Protocol, international law experts have claimed that all countries remain 
bound by international law to follow principles of non-refoulement—the principle of not 
returning refugees to their home country against their will.28  
Such a large number of Iraqi refugees have started seeking closer countries of first 
asylum because of the costs associated with relocation. The majority of Iraqis are 
constrained from seeking refuge outside of the surrounding region due to the obstructive 
cost of the journey, and due to restrictive administrative practices in receiving countries. 
In these neighboring countries, many refugees fall into urban settlement patterns, which 
represents a departure from other past refugee crises. Typically, refugee camps serve to 
consolidate refugees in a central location, making it easier to distribute aid to refugees. 
However, in refugee camps like those in Syria and Jordan, Iraqis are placed in a more 
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urban setting and are also dispersed.29 Humanitarian efforts have been made more 
difficult by the lack of accurate and reliable estimates on the number and needs of Iraqis 
living as refugees in neighboring countries. It is difficult to target and record Iraqis 
because they are living interspersed with the natural population, especially in urban areas. 
This makes aid distribution more difficult and less effective.30   
Many of Iraq’s neighboring countries have refused to grant Iraqis legal refugee 
status because they fear an overwhelming drain on national resources, due to the 
overwhelming number of refugees who have fled over Iraq’s borders. A primary concern 
is the declining absorptive capacity of neighboring countries, and whether or not they can 
provide the resources necessary for such a large refugee population. Regardless of the 
desire of these nations to host Iraqi refugees, refugee flows are generally disruptive and 
can inhibit stability in already unstable regions.31 
A third major problem facing Iraqi refugees is the weak capacity of the Iraqi 
government to assist its IDPs and refugees that have fled. In 2007, the Iraqi government 
pledged $25 million to assist Iraqi refugees in neighboring states. The payment of this 
pledge was delayed until mid 2008. For this reason, some of Iraq’s neighboring countries 
that have been hosting Iraqi refugees have expressed discontent over the perceived lack 
of support from the Iraqi government for its own citizens, at home and abroad. Some see 
this lack of adequate funding as an indication of the Maliki government’s unwillingness 
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to seriously assist its own people.32  
Some experts believe that sectarian divisions have influenced the behavior of the 
majority Shiite Iraqi government. According to UNHCR estimates, approximately 67% 
of registered Iraqi refugees in Syria are Sunni Muslims. Some scholars suggest that 
religious differences have prevented greater support from the Iraqi government. In the 
United States, Congress has voiced concerns about the level of resources the Iraqi 
government has pledged to assist Iraqi refugees and IDPs. On the other hand, some 
experts suggest that the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) has 
simply lacked the capacity to respond adequately to the refugee crisis. In response to the 
lack of developmental capacity of the Iraqi government, UNHCR and other international 
organizations have emphasized that international aid must be increased. UNHCR has 
emphasized the need for program development within host countries as well as for NGOs 
that are providing humanitarian assistance.33  
 
International Response to the Crisis 
Over the course of the conflict in Iraq, UNHCR has regularly released guidelines 
for states to follow with regards to refugee determination. Per the UN mandate for 
UNHCR, the body must try to ensure that states uphold their own obligations under the 
1951 Refugee Convention. Despite the power of UNHCR’s recommendations, some 
states have been unwilling to fully accept these recommendations. Worldwide, there are 
few states that have granted Iraqis full refugee status, with the majority failing to provide 
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even complementary protection.34  
According to UNHCR, whose mandate requires it to propose final solutions to the 
refugee crisis, there exist three possible solutions as an end point of the crisis. The first 
and most preferred solution is voluntary refugee repatriation. In most cases, the majority 
of refugees prefer to return home as soon as circumstances in their home country permit, 
often times when the conflict situation has abated and a level of order has been restored. 
UNHCR does promote, support, and facilitate voluntary repatriation as the best solution 
for displaced people, as long as the process of reintegration is safe and viable. The second 
solution proposed by UNHCR is the resettlement of refugees in the country of asylum. 
UNHCR facilitates the process of integrating refugees into various host countries and 
helping refugees to transition to a new life. This solution is preferable in cases where 
refugees are unwilling or unable to return to their country of origin in the face of possible 
persecution. Although this is a viable solution, UNHCR data sets show that only a small 
number of countries permit and encourage refugee resettlement.35  
The third possible solution is an extension of the second: permanent resettlement 
of refugees in third countries. According to UNHCR, only a small number of nations take 
part in UNHCR resettlement programs, which includes accepting annual quotas of 
refugees.36 This is because it is difficult to align the migration destination choices of 
refugees with the host states’ costs of hosting refugees. Since the Convention was 
adopted in 1951, the resettlement regime has become less attractive to wealthy states. If 
                                                      
34 Sperl, 4-5.  
35 Government Accountability Office, 9-10. 
36 Ibid., 10. 
 51 
some heterogeneity exists between the costs of hosting refugees, often times the “first 
best” will not be implemented. The “first best” is defined as a matching up of the 
migration destination choices of refugees with the cost-minimizing allocation of refugees 
to host states.37 
While it provides a permanent solution to the refugee crisis, refugee resettlement 
has its benefits and its drawbacks. It is necessary to keep in mind that the global refugee 
populations do not make up a static pool of individuals that can be easily counted and 
organized. Resettlement not only affects the host country, but it also creates 
consequences in future migration patterns, future refugee flows, and the attitudes and 
actions of existing refugee camp populations. A major resettlement program can produce 
unintended consequences in the sending country, and it can affect the politics in the 
country of origin as well as the country of asylum. Large-scale resettlement programs can 
have the unintended effect of discouraging other, sometimes superior, durable solutions. 
For this reason, UNHCR ranks voluntary repatriation and local integration in the current 
country of asylum higher than major refugee resettlement programs.38 
Since the start of the Iraq War in 2003, UNHCR’s position has continually been 
that Iraqi asylum-seekers should be either recognized as refugees or provided with 
another form of international protection, with special consideration given to those from 
Central and Southern Iraq. Before the escalation of sectarian violence that occurred in 
September 2004 and September 2005, UNHCR issued Return Advisories that 
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emphasized the need for individual status determination to be carried out for each Iraqi 
asylum seeker that may be returned home. These Return Advisories also called for a 
minimum level of protection for all Iraqi asylum-seekers outside of Iraq, until the security 
situation improved and refugee return became feasible and beneficial. Since the Samarra 
bombings in February 2006, subsequent UNHCR guidelines further emphasized the need 
for greater numbers of Iraqis to be granted refugee status. The September 2007 
recommendations reaffirmed UNHCR’s December 2006 position, stating that all Iraqi 
asylum-seekers from Central and Southern Iraq “should be considered as refugees based 
on the 1951 Convention criteria.” Additionally, for those not granted automatic refugee 
status, UNHCR continues to strongly recommend that “international protection should be 
afforded” through a complementary form of protection.39  
Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, UNHCR has continually maintained its 
opposition to any program of forced returns of failed Iraqi asylum-seekers, due mainly to 
persistent security concerns. UNHCR has also discouraged states from implementing 
voluntary return programs to Southern and Central Iraq, which might inadvertently or 
implicitly encourage Iraqis to return home before they should. Many of the UNHCR 
guidelines are based on the premise that Iraqis generally lack an Internal Flight 
Alternative, which is defined as the possibility for Iraqis to find protection elsewhere in 
their country of origin. Widespread violence, as well as the difficulties and costs 
associated with extensive travel, has prevented Iraqis from seeking refuge within Iraq.40  
Regarding Central and Southern Iraq, the final UNHCR guidelines have 
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emphasized that those Iraqis granted refugee status prior to the 2003 invasion should not 
have their refugee status revoked, despite the fall of the Iraqi Ba’ath government. Prior to 
2003, refugee status was granted on the basis of the threat of persecution by Saddam 
Hussein’s regime. UNHCR maintains that the prevailing instability in Iraq is grounds for 
maintaining refugee status.41  
In contrast to UNHCR’s position regarding Central and Southern Iraq, UNHCR’s 
position regarding Northern Iraq has been slightly more lenient. By comparison, the 
security situation in the three Kurdish-controlled Northern Governates has remained 
markedly more stable than in the rest of the country. As such, UNHCR has stated that 
voluntary returns to this region may be possible. In saying so, UNHCR has strongly 
qualified this position by restating that nations must remain sensitive to the unstable 
security situation throughout Iraq. Its guidelines emphasize that states wishing to 
voluntarily or forcibly return Iraqis to Northern Iraq must take the position of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) into account. In the past, the KRG authorities 
have stated that they “strongly oppose any forcible returns to Northern Iraq.42  
The topic of voluntary returns of refugees to their home country remains 
controversial. In late 2007, the number of returned refugees to Iraq increased. At the time, 
these successful returns were credited to an improved security situation in Iraq. On the 
other hand, these returns can also be interpreted as a political move by the Iraqi 
government in response to pressure to demonstrate progress in the rebuilding process. 
These returns can also be seen as a way to acknowledge and demonstrate a reduction in 
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violence by the United States and as a way to prove the positive and critical impact of the 
previous troop surge that occurred in 2006.43  
This positive outlook contrasts with statements made by UNHCR at the time 
warning about the dangers of preemptive voluntary returns programs. UNHCR stated that 
it did not consider conditions in Iraq at that time to be conducive to voluntary returns. 
This statement was primarily due to concerns about security and protection for returnees 
in Iraq as well as the lack of absorptive capacity and infrastructure to implement a 
beneficial returns program. According to reports, up to 70% of Iraqi refugees who did 
return to Baghdad were unable to resettle in their own homes, either because someone 
else was living there or because the ethnic composition of the neighborhood posed social 
dangers. The main fear was that MoDM lacked the resources and competency to 
effectively process potentially large-scale returns.44 
In addition to voluntary returns, some nations have created policies of forced 
returns of refugees to their home country. In countries neighboring Iraq, such as Lebanon, 
refugees that are arrested because they lack legal refugee status are given the option of 
“voluntary deportation” to Iraq or to remain in jail. European countries, such as the 
United Kingdom, have sent Iraqis back to the Kurdish-controlled North, which has been 
considered sufficiently stable and safe for returns.45 In contrast, by 2007, Sweden had 
received the highest number of Iraqi refugees. According to UNHCR’s Statistics on 
Displaced Iraqis Around the World from September 2007, Sweden granted protection 
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status to more Iraqis in 2006 than the rest of EU combined.46 
In addition to UNHCR, several other major international NGOs with expertise on 
refugee issues have issued their own declarations regarding the Iraqi refugee crisis. These 
NGOs, including Amnesty International, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE) and Human Rights Watch, have declared recommendations on Iraqi asylum-
seekers consistent with those guidelines issued by UNHCR. In addition, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross has stated that the security situation in Iraq since 2004 has 
qualified as an “internal armed conflict.” At a conference in 2007, organized by UNHCR 
to draw international attention to the Iraqi refugee crisis, both UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees Antonio Guterres and the UN Secretary General called on states to grant 
protection to Iraqi asylum-seekers.47 
The international response to the Iraqi refugee crisis has been widespread. On 
August 14, 2003, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1500, which established the 
UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). UNAMI coordinates the United Nations 
Country Team, which is composed of sixteen UN agencies and programs involved in Iraq, 
and it works with international and local staff. At present, Martin Kobler serves as the 
UN Secretary General’s special envoy to Iraq and head of UNAMI, replacing Steffan de 
Mistura in August 2011. On August 7, 2008, the UN Security Council Resolution 1830 
extended UNAMI’s mandate for an additional year. In coordination with the Iraqi MoDM, 
UNHCR is the focal point for the United Nations’ Cluster Approach on refugees and 
IDPs. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) serves as deputy coordinator. 
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The UN Operation in Iraq is divided into clusters such as agriculture and food security, 
education, and human development. It maintains a separate cluster for Refugees, 
Internally Displaced Persons and Durable Solutions.48  
On July 27, 2006, the UN launched an International Compact for Iraq, in 
conjunction with the government of Iraq. The International Compact came in response to 
continuing and vocal efforts by the United States encouraging an increase in donor 
contributions and international funding for aid. This initiative came about as a way to 
coordinate donor contributions and the donor structure for aid to Iraq. Under the 
International Compact initiative, donors pledge funds in return for promises of reform 
from the Iraqi government. Specifically, donors hope to exchange funds for a five-year 
program developed by the government of Iraq, outlining specific steps to take towards 
long-term economic and political development and reform. At a donor meeting held on 
May 3, 2007, the Compact and its terms were outlined and finalized. Over sixty countries 
attended the meeting, held in Egypt. One year later, the First Anniversary Ministerial 
Review of the International Compact with Iraq was held in Stockholm, Sweden, on May 
29, 2008. Although the Compact focuses largely on economic and political development, 
the first annual progress review briefly referenced the problem of IDPs within Iraq and 
the need to discuss assistance for Iraqi refugees with neighboring countries.49 
However, while UNHCR and others in the humanitarian community view Iraq as 
currently inhospitable to a returns program, the problem highlights the difficult balance 
countries need to strike in being open to asylum seekers, fulfilling their obligations, and 
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helping those who want to resettle in third countries. Countries must also take into 
consideration the particular status of those applying, the resources within the country’s 
communities, and the need for burden sharing between states on overall resettlement 
programs.50 As major donor countries and important players on the world political stage, 
members of the European Union did not develop a fully comprehensive refugee policy 
that could provide the basis for a joint EU approach to the provision of refugee assistance 
in regions of origin, as well as the establishment of more uniform resettlement programs. 
It should also have included the adoption of measures to ensure that asylum-seekers were 
able to access the territory of a country of asylum in order to seek international protection. 
The lack of such an organized and uniform policy has been painfully evident in the EU’s 
poor response to the Iraqi refugee crisis.51 It is probably fair to say that so far, the most 
evident sign of a common EU refugee policy is a negative one: it consists of preventing 
asylum-seekers from reaching EU territory in the first place. This much can be gauged 
from the difficulties and obstacles Iraqi refugees have faced in trying to make the journey 
to Europe and the high costs involved. 
The international response to the Iraqi refugee crisis can be analyzed according to 
the level of internationalization of the refugee crisis. Hakovirta’s assessment of 
international and national response suggests that the internationalization of a specific 
refugee crisis depends on the seriousness of the refugee crisis itself, the nature of the 
underlying conflicts causing the refugee crisis, and the efforts undertaken by the state and 
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other actors to manage and solve the crisis.52 As this process gets underway, individual 
governments must decide how to respond to the refugee flows. A host government has 
three clear choices when it comes to accepting refugees: do nothing, respond negatively, 
or respond positively.53 In the case of Iraq, the countries located the closest to Iraq 
geographically have been burdened with the majority of the Iraqi refugees. The inability 
of Iraq to solve or even alleviate the refugee crisis has produced resentment in the 
neighboring countries shouldered with the burden of receiving Iraqi refugees. The 
perceived lack of effort by the Iraqi government to fix the problem could account for 
some of the hesitance in countries like Jordan and Syria to extend full refugee status to 
Iraqis. 
For those nations like the United States that are located far away from the locus of 
the crisis, geopolitics has played a smaller role in the immediate decision to admit or 
reject Iraqi refugees. The international response has been not so much geopolitical in 
nature as it has been humanitarian in nature.  Since countries like the United States are 
located outside of close geographic proximity to the center of the refugee crisis, the 
responsibility has been spread overseas and thus removed tangibly and intangibly.   
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CHAPTER 3: THE RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE IRAQI  
REFUGEE CRISIS 
 
 
History of US Refugee Policy 
The emergence of a coordinated refugee policy in the United States occurred 
following World War II. In parallel to the global trend towards the creation of an 
international refugee regime, the United States, too, began consolidating its first major 
refugee policy as a result of the heretofore-unseen number of refugees created by WWII. 
The Displaced Persons Act (DPA) of 1948 thus came as a direct response to the first 
major international refugee crisis. The core of the DPA demonstrated its foundation in 
contemporary events: the act required proof that refugees had entered allied zones in 
Germany, Austria, or Italy before December 22, 1945, in order for individuals to be 
classified as refugees and be eligible for resettlement in the United States. One 
unintended consequence of this requirement was that it hindered the admittance of Jews 
fleeing nations other than Germany. This act represented the first legislation to mark the 
beginning of a restrictive period in refugee policy. During the decades to follow, the fear 
that immigrants and refugees would take American jobs affected immigration policy and 
made immigration and asylum policy more restricted.1 
The DPA remained in effect until 1950. As post-WWII politics began to settle and 
alliances began to form, the United States came to view refugee policy as a potentially 
beneficial political tool on the international stage. Specifically, the United States sought 
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to use refugee and asylum policy as a way to combat communism. During the Cold War, 
the United States sought to discredit communism by admitting refugees from nations 
governed by communist regimes.  By accepting asylum-seekers from communist nations, 
the United States sought to demonstrate that these nations were unable to adequately 
provide for their citizens. In doing so, the United States sought to attack communist 
regimes, as well as weaken them by draining human capacity. In addition, by accepting 
numerous refugees from abroad, the United States sought to improve its own national 
image. In this way, refugee policy that focused on specific admissions became a type of 
“propaganda tool.” For this reason, the DPA was amended in 1950 to incorporate this 
strategy and to provide refugees fleeing communist regimes the most protection. The 
1950 amendment specifically extended protection to refugees from communist China. In 
addition, in 1951 the original cut off date for refugees to have entered an allied zone was 
expanded to January 1, 1945, for resettlement eligibility, which would allow for higher 
level of refugee admissions.2 
 At this time, the aforementioned UN Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees was also introduced. The United States did not originally ratify the Convention 
and Protocol.3 The next form of American legislation, the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952, consolidated US immigration and asylum policy; however, it failed to make 
provisions for any type of humanitarian admissions. In 1956, after the refugee crisis in 
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which 150,000 Hungarians fled a Soviet invasion, Congress responded with the Refugee-
Escape Act of 1957. This act created a permanent category for refugee admissions within 
the category of immigrant admissions, but it still failed to incorporate UNCHR’s 
definition of “refugee” (as defined by the UN Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees).  Instead, the act defined a refugee as a person fleeing a “Communist or 
Communist-dominated country or . . . any country within the Middle East.”4 At this time, 
preference towards refugees from communist nations remained imbedded in US policy. 
In 1965, Congress amended the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act with the 
incorporation of a Conditional Entry Program, maintaining the uniquely American 
definition of “refugee.”5 Under this program, a preference category was established for a 
maximum of 17,400 refugees who feared persecution and were fleeing either a 
“Communist- dominated” country or a country “within the general area of the Middle 
East.” The conditional aspect of this program meant that those admitted by this 
preference category were able to apply for adjustment of their temporary status to 
permanent residence after two years.6  
One important aspect of current US refugee policy, which played a role in 
eventual legislation reform, is the parole power of the president. This executive power 
permits the president to admit asylum-seekers into the United States on an individual 
basis. Although the president may admit individuals at will, the parole power does not 
grant the parolee protection against future removal from the country. This power grants 
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the president unreviewable executive discretion; in this way, the president has final 
determination of regions from which specific refugees are admitted. Although the parole 
power was intended primarily as a temporary measure, by 1965 it became a numerically 
significant part of the US immigration system. Historically, the use of the parole power 
has illustrated the opportunity for foreign policy bias to have an effect on the refugee 
admission process.7  
Meital Waibsnaider notes that it is important to understand how the president’s 
parole power was one factor that contributed to the eventual passage of the politically 
neutral Refugee Act of 1980. In 1980, the first comprehensive refugee legislation in the 
United States was enacted under President Jimmy Carter. The 1980 Refugee Act created 
domestic statutory law governing refugees in the United States by replicating the 1951 
UNHCR Convention and 1967 Protocol.8 Under the new act, the official definition of 
what constituted a “refugee” was revised, and the United States officially discarded its 
blatantly anti-communist definition that gave preference to those hailing from communist 
countries.9 The new definition was intentionally aligned with the UN Convention and 
Protocol, thus bringing US refugee policy under international standards and norms. By 
the new definition, ad hoc refugee and asylum procedures were discarded, and every 
asylum-seeker was defined as a refugee.10 The goal of the act was to remove any foreign 
policy bias regarding refugee admission and put forth politically neutral language. At the 
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time, human rights groups praised the change in legislation as necessary and 
meaningful.11   
The Refugee Act of 1980 created the new Office of Refugee Resettlement, which 
was responsible for funding and administering federal programs for domestic 
resettlement and assistance to refugees. It also created the framework by which the US 
government implements its refugee and asylum policy today. Actual refugee selection 
involves the US President, Congress, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as 
well as the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). PRM is the office that 
accepts and screens refugee applications. The Refugee Corps of the DHS, which is 
comprised of officers from the US Citizenship and Immigration Services, makes the 
individual determination of refugee status. This office then applies specific “processing 
priorities” to determine which refugees from each region will be admitted.12  
As an extension of the president’s parole power, the processing priorities are 
established yearly as part of the annual proposed refugee admissions and are heavily 
influenced by the executive branch. The act authorizes the president to make an annual 
determination of how many refugees may be admitted in the upcoming fiscal year, with 
no upper or lower limits on the numbers, but it also includes a requirement that the 
president consult with Congress before making any numerical determinations. The 
presidential determination applies to the regions from which refugees may be admitted.13  
In the 1980s, the efficacy of the Refugee Act was tested as thousands of refugees 
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arrived from Latin America, Cuba and Haiti. The response by the Reagan Administration 
cast doubt on whether or not the anti-communist bias was still in existence. Asylum 
admission rates for Nicaraguans and Cubans, who were fleeing leftist governments, 
proved higher than those for refugees from Guatemala, El Salvador and Haiti.14 Although 
the act attempted to create a politically neutral policy, foreign policy considerations 
remained an underlying influencing factor.  
After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the proverbial end of the Cold War, 
international refugee policy, as well as US refugee policy, shifted its focus away from 
receiving the majority of refugees from communist countries. The end of the Cold War 
power struggle meant that admitting refugees from communism was no longer an 
advantageous way to shame the opponents of the United States. As the number of 
potential refugees from communist countries decreased, the United States also enacted 
more restrictive asylum policies that tended to decrease total refugee admissions.15 In the 
1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, the United States 
tightened its procedures for determining official refugee status. The act shortened the 
time limit for new asylum applications, imposed broader asylum detention provisions, 
and provided for an expedited removal process for rejected applicants.16 These factors 
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lead to an overall decrease in refugee admissions. 
Generally, US refugee policy has changed over time. So, however, have the type 
and number of refugee flows around the world. Subsequently, national refugee policies 
have had to change over the course of the twenty-first century. Whereas the first half of 
the century was marked by large, steady refugee flows from a limited number of 
locations, later refugee flows are and will be categorized by smaller-scale flows and 
resettlement initiatives. Refugees from Vietnam and the former Soviet Union, the two 
major sending countries for the earliest era of refugees, were geared towards long-term 
resettlement. In addition, current refugees are often processed in a dangerous or unstable 
environment and come from a wide array of nations and distinct situations. This poses a 
challenge not only to the refugees in question but also to the immigration and refugee 
officials from the receiving country. This means that officers from the Department of 
State and the Department of Homeland Security are thus faced with logistical challenges 
and constant changes to the refugee program. Now, countries are faced with the necessity 
of improving refugee admissions by creating a flexible system that can quickly approve 
new settlement initiatives.17 
 
Possible Approaches to Refugee Policy 
The Refugee Act of 1980 required that refugee admissions be neutral and that 
foreign policy play no role in refugee admission and treatment. However, in practice, 
refugee policy is based on a variety of outside and partial factors. Models for approaches 
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to refugee programs include those that strictly pertain to national self-interest, 
humanitarian concerns, or, more specifically, human rights concerns. The national self-
interest approach takes foreign policy goals into consideration when developing a refugee 
policy, thus negating the concept of neutral refugee policy. Often times, a receiving 
country may use a refugee program to benefit the nation politically, at both the domestic 
and international levels. Foreign policy bias in refugee selection consists of accepting 
refugees from certain countries in order to shame and embarrass the ruling governments. 
A perfect example of this strategy was the anti-communist bias embedded in the US 
refugee policy during the Cold War. On the other hand, the nation may bar or limit 
refugees from certain countries whose governments it supports, effectively refusing to 
acknowledge the existence of refugees.18 One example of this approach was the 
reluctance of the United States to acknowledge and accept refugees from Guatemala or El 
Salvador, two countries whose civil wars involved US participation. This model can be 
considered a partial perspective, in which cultural and national community shapes 
national identity and creates admissions categories.19  
The national self-interest model also applies to the practice of categorizing some 
refugees who are fleeing home countries that are American allies as economic migrants, 
instead of granting them refugee status. In the case of both Hungary and Vietnam, 
refugee admissions were increased for countries in which the United States had interfered 
militarily. By encouraging uprisings but failing to provide adequate military support, a 
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new category of refugee caused by specific foreign actions has emerged. Although this 
may raise the ceiling for refugee admissions, this type of policy still carries a foreign 
policy bias because the government involved still determines whether or not its actions 
have created the category defined as “refugees.” The national-interest response has been 
characterized as conducive to refugee resettlement with regards to burden sharing. 
Burden sharing is defined as the attempt by receiving countries to distribute the burdens 
placed on host countries through financial support and refugee admissions. These policies 
are often based on the foreign policy and national self- interest goals of each country.20 
A second refugee model is the humanitarian approach model, which aims to 
relieve the suffering of the largest numbers of refugees. This model bases state responses 
on the level of refugee need or the extremity of the refugee predicament, instead of 
“value-laden distinctions” that include the preference of certain refugees over others. This 
model contends that it is hard, if not impossible, to distinguish or prioritize the various 
dangers facing different refugee populations, including disease, hunger, or sustained 
armed conflict.21 The norm of humanitarianism grew out of the assumption that extreme 
situations, like refugee crises, give rise to special responsibilities. In these crisis situations, 
the low cost creates positive duties of responsibility.22  
Matthew Gibney elaborates on the liberal-utilitarian political theory of refugee 
policy. According to this impartial and neutral perspective, universal moral claims restrict 
the legitimate grounds upon which states can deny entrance to refugees. By standards of 
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impartiality, current entrance restrictions on immigrants and refugees violate the human 
liberty to reside where ones pleases by making distinct admissions categories. The liberal 
perspective supports the free movement of people, which parallels the support of free 
international movement of goods and services. By utility, Gibney describes how liberal 
democracies feel the obligation to increase their immigrant and refugee admissions until 
there exists an equilibrium between the marginal utilities gained through extra 
immigration and the costs to residents, by both residents and potential entrants. This 
produces a type of moral brinkmanship, in which a state is obligated to accept refugees 
up to the brink of productive utility.23  
The third model of refugee policy is the human rights approach. By this model, 
policy efforts select refugees individually, based on the degree of human rights violations 
each individual has suffered. In addition, there is a heavy focus on deterrence; this model 
seeks to deter the home country government from continuing these violations of human 
rights by focusing on individual human rights. One issue with this model is the difficulty 
with making individualized determinations about which refugees have suffered, or are in 
danger of suffering, the “worst” kinds of human rights violations. This process, while 
relying heaving on value-laden distinctions, is also more challenging and time-consuming. 
At times, the human rights model of refugee policy can be used as a cover for hidden 
political or national interest purposes, because the guise of human rights brings with it a 
moral superiority of action.24 
Generally, the interaction of all three distinct models produces a nation’s refugee 
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policy. In order to understand how US refugee policy is produced, one must understand 
the bureaucratic organization of the structures governing refugee policy.  
 
The US Refugee Program 
At present, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) define laws governing the 
admission and resettlement of refugees to the United States. According to the INA, a 
“refugee” is defined as “a person who is outside his or her country and who is unable or 
unwilling to return because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.” The Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 
(PRM) has primary responsibility for interpreting these laws by formulating US foreign 
policy on population issues, protection and assistance to refugees and conflict victims, 
and international migration. PRM is responsible for administering all US refugee 
assistance and admission programs, including programs and policies in response to 
humanitarian emergencies worldwide. In this capacity, PRM seeks to resolve protracted 
refugee situations.25  
To do so, PRM works closely with regional bureaus, US embassies, and US 
missions to provide guidance to its implementing partners, including international 
organizations and NGOs, and engage with other donor countries and countries hosting 
Iraqi refugees. PRM primarily implements its US humanitarian assistance goals for Iraqi 
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refugees by funding and monitoring international organization and nongovernmental 
organization projects. PRM is also responsible for managing the US Refugee Admissions 
Program (USRAP).26 
The Department of State (DOS) is in charge of processing refugees overseas. 
Under the INA, all refugees are processed and admitted to the United States from abroad. 
Processing and admission is priority based, and the system defines three priorities for 
admission to the United States.  Priority One (P-1) covers the most serious protection 
cases in which no durable solution exists. Refugees of all nationalities, including Iraqis, 
are eligible for P-1 processing. UNHCR, a US embassy, or a specially designated NGO 
may refer these refugees to the US refugee program.27   
The Priority Two (P-2) category encompasses groups of “special humanitarian 
concern” to the United States. This category includes specific groups within certain 
nationalities, clans, or ethnic groups that have been specially identified. The Priority 
Three (P-3) category includes family reunification cases involving spouses, unmarried 
children under the age of twenty-one, and parents of individuals who were previously 
admitted to the United States as refugees or granted asylum.28 
 Under the US refugee program, those who apply for refugee status are checked 
and verified through the Department of State’s Consular Lookout and Support System 
(CLASS). Within this system, certain applicants require further investigation.  For these 
applicants, the Department of State must obtain a Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) from 
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the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The SAO process is comprised of additional 
database searches to check for information on the applicant. In addition to this process, 
Iraqi refugees are subject to enhanced security screening procedures established by the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).29  
Applicants who pass the preliminary qualifications for refugee status are 
presented to the Department of Homeland Security’s US Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) for an in-person interview. USCIS, within the DHS, is responsible for 
interviewing refugees and adjudicating their applications for resettlement in the United 
States. Consequently, USCIS makes the final decision about whether an applicant is 
eligible for refugee status and generally admissible to the United States.30   
The number of refugees to be admitted to the United States each year is proposed 
by the president. Before the beginning of each fiscal year, the president submits a report 
to Congress called the consultation document. This report contains the administration’s 
proposed refugee ceiling and regional allocations for the year. Congress then reviews the 
report. Upon congressional agreement and consultation, the president then issues a 
Presidential Determination setting the refugee numbers for that year.31  
 
Policy Response to Iraqi Refugees 
Starting in 2006, the United States began putting in place new immigration 
mechanisms in addition to its existing structures, in order to handle the increase in the 
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number of Iraqi refugees. Many of these programs were established in order to facilitate 
the admission of Iraqis who had worked for or had been closely associated with the US 
government or US military. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006 
authorized DHS to grant legal permanent resident status to certain Iraqi and Afghani 
nationals classified as “special immigrants.” This status may be granted to those Iraqis 
who have worked directly with the US Armed Forces, under Chief of Mission authority, 
as well as their spouses and children. For FY 2007 and FY 2008, this program was 
capped at 500 aliens (excluding spouses and children). For subsequent years, this number 
was reduced to 50 aliens (excluding spouses and children).32 
In February 2007, Ellen Sauerbrey, Assistant Secretary of State for Population, 
Refugees, and Migration, announced that the United States would process 7,000 Iraqi 
refugees by the end of September, and approximately half would arrive in the United 
States by that time. By September 30, only 1600 had entered the United States.  
In February 2007, the State Department established the Iraq Refugee and 
Internally Displaced Persons Task Force, a committee designed to coordinate the work of 
the United States with various international organizations. The task force included 
officials from the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Homeland 
Security, who sought to work together to coordinate refugee and IDP assistance and 
refugee resettlement. From 2006 to 2007, the United States increased funding for Iraqi 
refugees from $43 million $200 million. This may have come as a result of various 
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appeals from international organization and nongovernmental organizations.33 
The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act was enacted in June 2007. This bipartisan bill was 
introduced by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR). The 
act passed in December 2007 and was eventually renamed as the Kennedy Amendment to 
the Department of Defense Authorization Bill. Its aim was to improve the response of the 
United States to the Iraqi refugee crisis and the plight of the Iraqi refugees. Again, a main 
focus was ensuring that Iraqis that had worked with the US government, military and 
contractors, as well as with the US media or other groups, were protected and given 
access to escape Iraq. In September 2007, the Secretary of State appointed Ambassador 
James B. Foley as the Senior Coordinator for Iraqi Refugee Issues. In addition, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security appointed Lori Scialabba as a Senior Advisor for Iraqi 
Refugee Affairs.34 
On January 28, 2008, the Department of Defense Authorization Act was signed 
into law for FY 2008. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 outlined the 
place of Iraqi refugees within this classification system. It outlined the commitment by 
the United States to take more decisive action to address the needs of Iraqi refugees 
generally, as well as focusing on providing routes of escape for endangered Iraqis who 
had been affiliated with the United States. This act defined new groups of Iraqis that may 
be processed under Priority Two. These new P-2 groups include Iraqis who are or were 
employed by the US government in Iraq, Iraqis who are or were employed in Iraq by 
either a media or nongovernmental organization headquartered in the United States (or an 
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entity closely associated with the US mission in Iraq that has received US government 
funding), and Iraqis who are members of a persecuted religious or minority group and 
have close family members in the United States. The act also established Iraqi eligibility 
for P-3 processing. In addition, the act required the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, to establish an in-country refugee-processing 
program for Iraqis.35  
These distinctions came under a broadening of the scope of the Department of 
Homeland Security’s authority to grant special immigrant status to certain Iraqi nationals. 
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 granted the Secretary of State the 
authority to grant special immigrant status in conjunction with the Secretary of Homeland 
Security. The law stated that Iraqi nationals were eligible for special immigrant status if 
they are or were employed by or on behalf of the U.S. government in Iraq on or after 
March 20, 2003, for not less than one year. Additional requirements to receive special 
immigrant status are documents proving valuable service to the US government, and that 
the applicant had experienced “an ongoing serious threat as a consequence of the alien’s 
employment by the United States government.”36  
The ceiling for this special immigrant program was capped at 5,000 principal 
aliens (excluding spouses and children) for each fiscal year 2008 through 2012. The 
National Defense Authorization Act requires the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, to establish or use existing refugee processing 
mechanisms in Iraq and elsewhere in the region for processing Iraqis under the new 
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special immigrant program. Furthermore, the law makes Iraqi special immigrants eligible 
for the same resettlement assistance, entitlement programs, and other benefits as refugees 
for up to eight months.37 
Given the ever-changing refugee ceilings and congressional and executive 
decisions, admissions of Iraqi refugees into the United States have fluctuated over the 
past ten years. In FY 2005, the total number of Iraqis admitted to the United States was 
198. In FY 2006, that number remained low at 202 admitted refugees. In FY 2007, the 
number increased to 1,608, and in FY 2008 the number totaled 13,823. It is important to 
note that in 2007, UNHCR referred a total of 14,698 Iraqis to the United States for 
resettlement. In FY 2007, the US Refugee Resettlement Program had allocated a ceiling 
of 7,000 refugees, which is half of that original number. Despite these recommendations 
and fairly generous ceilings, only 1,608 Iraqis were admitted in 2007.38  
In FY 2008, the total worldwide refugee ceiling in the United States was 80,000 
admissions. This number included 70,000 admissions allocated across various regions as 
well as an unallocated reserve of 10,000 additional admissions, to be used if the need for 
additional refugee slots develops. The FY 2008 allocation for the Near East and South 
Asia region, which includes the country of Iraq, was 28,000. According to the FY 2008 
consultation document, this allocation was primarily meant to include vulnerable Iraqis, 
Bhutanese, and Iranian religious and ethnic minorities. By comparison, the United States 
admitted just 13,832 Iraqis during 2008. According to US Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, as of March 31, 2012, the US has admitted a total of 64,174 Iraqi refugees 
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through its USRAP program (which has run from FY 2007 to FY 2012.)39 
Refugee admissions are intimately connected to the program of resettlement that 
the United States has chosen. Iraqis who are admitted to the United States are set on a 
path to temporary to eventually permanent resettlement.40 Currently, the process of Iraqi 
resettlement to the United States begins in the local UNHCR office. Iraqi refugees must 
first register with UNHCR in order to be eligible for resettlement referral. After this 
registration process, UNHCR refers the most vulnerable cases first to the United States. 
Priority resettlement is granted to victims of torture or severe trauma, single mothers, 
unaccompanied children, and those with severe medical problems. In addition, Iraqis with 
ties to the US military, the UN, or other international organizations in Iraq are also given 
priority. After referral by UNHCR, the next step is an interview with immigration 
officials from the Department of Homeland Security. The United States also provides 
direct refugee processing for Iraqi former employees. 41  
The registration process itself can be an ordeal. As of fall 2007, the closest US 
processing office accessible to Iraqi refugees was in Amman, Jordan. That means there 
existed no facility in Iraq for former employees to access. At the same time, refugees 
outside of Iraq that are seeking aid in a US processing office must work with UNHCR in 
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order to obtain necessary documents that protect them from future deportation back to 
Iraq.42 This process of resettlement is part of the policy arm of the US response to the 
Iraqi refugee crisis.  
 
Iraqi Refugee Policy 
The US response to the Iraqi refugee crisis has two arms: the humanitarian side 
and the policy side. First and foremost, the Iraqi War provoked a humanitarian crisis of 
global proportions. In total, the US State Department calculates that the US government 
has provided over $1 billion in humanitarian assistance since 2003 to displaced Iraqis and 
other groups made vulnerable during the war. The majority of this funding, including 
requests from the Bush Administration and congressional action, has been raised through 
emergency supplemental appropriations.43  
The US State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration 
(PRM) has provided refugee assistance mostly through its international partners, which 
include UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Office 
of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) at the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) has provided humanitarian assistance aimed at IDPs within Iraq. This assistance 
consists of the provision of emergency relief supplies, water systems, and support for 
infrastructure rehabilitation in local communities. It also includes support for emergency 
and mobile medical teams as well as small-scale livelihood projects.44 
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In addition to its work with its implementing partners in Iraq, congressional 
appropriations and budget changes have been a hallmark of the US humanitarian 
response. In FY 2007, Congress set aside $171 million for humanitarian assistance 
through PRM and OFDA. This amount included $37 million in response to UNHCR’s 
appeal and $39 million to the UNHCR/UNICEF Joint Education Appeal.45  
In FY 2008, the Bush Administration’s supplemental request asked for $230 
million for Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) for anticipated and unanticipated 
refugee and migration emergencies. Of the $230 requested, $195 million was requested 
specifically for humanitarian assistance to Iraqi refugees. In the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act (P.L.110-161), $200 million was appropriated for MRA. The 
remaining $30 million (of the original $230 million request) became part of the Bush 
Administration’s second FY 2008 supplemental request. The Administration’s second FY 
2008 supplemental request did not include funding for the International Disaster 
Assistance (IDA) account (In the Consolidated Appropriations Act [PL 110-161], $110 
million was appropriated for the emergency humanitarian assistance, with $80 million for 
Iraq). For FY 2009, the Administration requested $191 million for supplemental MRA 
funding, which included $141 million for Iraqi refugees. The Administration requested 
$45 million in its FY 2009 supplemental request.46 
In response to these requests, congressional action has included bills granting 
supplemental funding for Iraqi refugees. For the FY 2008 supplemental request, the June 
30-enacted version of HR 2642 provided $315 million for MRA (which was $285 million 
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above the request) to meet global refugee needs worldwide. This included humanitarian 
assistance for Iraqi refugees in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, and the region, as 
well as for IDPs in Iraq. Congress mandated that these funds could also be used to 
support the admissions costs of Iraqi refugees and other requirements of the Iraqi refugee 
program. The final June 30 version of the bill provided $350 million for MRA in the FY 
2009 supplemental, nearly 50% more than requested, in order to respond to urgent 
humanitarian and refugee admissions requirements such as assistance for refugees from 
Iraq.47  
For FY 2008, the June 30-enacted version of HR 2642 included $220 million for 
IDA for urgent humanitarian crises worldwide, including countries affected by the 
ongoing food crisis, but it did not specify an amount for Iraq. The FY 2009 regular 
budget request did not include funding for Iraqi refugees or IDPs. For FY 2009, the bill 
included $200 million for IDA for ongoing humanitarian needs worldwide, and it 
specified that some of these funds could be allocated to assist IDPs in Iraq and be used in 
response to the international food crisis.48 
When analyzing the extent of US humanitarian aid to Iraq, it is necessary to take 
into account the competing priorities of giving aid while maintaining the national budget. 
After the start of the Iraq War in 2003, rising costs of war have contributed to budget 
deficits. In order to combat these deficits, discretionary spending, or government 
spending through an appropriations bill, is typically slowed or reduced. As disaster 
contingency accounts are depleted when disasters require immediate relief, these 
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accounts must be replenished in order to respond to future humanitarian crises, including 
the Iraqi refugee crisis. Another issue is donor fatigue and the lack of aid pledges, as 
multiple humanitarian crises emerge in other disaster areas.49  
Regarding the current humanitarian crisis in Iraq, some critics have questioned if 
the United States has requested sufficient funds to handle a worsening crisis. The vast 
majority of humanitarian aid provided by the United States has been by way of 
supplemental appropriations. On one hand, budgetary restrictions may tie the hands of 
US politicians. On the other, some experts argue that the United States now has a greater 
responsibility as a role model for committing funds to address the needs of Iraqi refugees 
and IDPs. They argue that if the United States increases its funding and resettlement 
numbers, other neighboring countries and the entire international community may be 
encouraged to do the same. Finding the correct balance of aid and burden sharing with 
the international community is the eventual goal.50 
Some international organizations, including Human Rights First, claim that the 
initial US response to the Iraqi refugee crisis has thus far been insufficient. Due to the 
role of the United States in the Iraq War, critics claim that the United States owes a 
special moral obligation or moral debt to Iraqis who worked for the United States and to 
those who were innocently involved.51 In a sense, the United States has not fully 
acknowledged its role in the Iraqi refugee crisis because that acknowledgment would be 
both politically and militarily embarrassing. Accepting high numbers of Iraqi refugees 
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would essentially force the United States to admit its role in creating these refugees. On a 
broader scale, an admission of this sort could signal weakness or defeat in the attempt to 
garner and retain support for the US war on terror. In this way, the issue of Iraqi refugees 
amounts to a battle of ideologies, similar to the mindset for refugee admissions during the 
Cold War. Current US refugee policy “contradicts the politically neutral spirit and 
language of the Act, the Convention, and the Protocol.”52 
Human Rights Watch has further blamed the US military operation in Iraq for the 
current refugee crisis. In an October 2005 report, the group stated as follows: 
[T]he United States had a legal obligation under international humanitarian law to 
take all measures in its power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order 
and safety [in Iraq]-an obligation the United States [has] failed to meet. U.S. and 
coalition forces largely stood by as individual Iraqis and organized groups looted 
government offices, hospitals, and, most dangerously for the country's security, 
abandoned police and army depots filled with arms and ammunition.53  
 
Many scholars believe that when the United States takes military action, it should not 
simultaneously close its borders to refugees that obtain this status as a result of its 
military action. In this case, the United States may have a moral obligation to put in place 
a policy that includes Iraq and Afghanistan refugees that have emerged as a result of US 
wars waged in these countries.54 
 In specific cases, the United States has developed a refugee policy and admitted 
refugees out of explicit or implicit moral obligation. The first example of this is the case 
of Hungarian refugees in 1956. After an invasion into Hungary by the Soviet Union, a 
Hungarian revolution broke out, resulting in tens of thousands of Hungarian refugees. In 
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total, the United States admitted approximately 40,000 Hungarian refugees after the crisis. 
This occurred despite the fact that Hungary remained a communist country. The 
admittance of these Hungarian refugees was largely attributed to a moral obligation 
derived from US military involvement in the area. The United States supported the 
Hungarian uprising as a boon to its foreign policy interest because any national 
opposition would have weakened the Soviet Union, a US enemy and the occupying 
power at the time. The failure of the US-backed revolution and the later withheld military 
aid promised to the Hungarians resulted in a feeling of moral responsibility to admit the 
refugees.55  
The second example of US refugee policy resulting from military involvement 
abroad is the period after the 1975 Vietnam War. After the refugee outflow caused by the 
Vietnam War and relating fighting, the United States provided UNHCR with 52% of its 
budget between 1975 and 1979. The United States also received 322,000 Indochinese 
refugees for resettlement out of the global total of approximately 583,000, including 
refugees from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.56  
In these two cases, the failure of US military action against communist regimes 
resulted in the destruction of a foreign nation and the endangerment of many people. 
Here, the United States acknowledged both a moral responsibility and an obligation to 
help those it had failed to successfully support abroad. In a sense, Waibsnaider sees these 
direct changes in refugee policy as examples of the United States attempting to rescue its 
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allies.57 It is necessary to consider the fact that changing US refugee policy and tailoring 
it to specifically aid allies does not maintain a politically neutral policy. Legislation that 
appears politically neutral may still be used to promote a foreign policy or preserve 
specific national self-interest. Thus, policy models may be both humanitarian and in the 
national interest.  
 Scholars have identified various additional issues with the US response to the 
Iraqi refugee crisis. Human rights groups, including Human Rights First, have found that 
one major problem is the prevalence of delays in refugee processing. Slow processing 
creates further backlogs in the resettlement process, and it also undermines how 
effectively the priority resettlement programs for US-affiliated Iraqis can be implemented. 
At the end of 2010, the processing time for US-affiliated Iraqis ranged from twelve to 
twenty-one months. Despite the existence of a priority access program that enables direct 
application for resettlement for those affiliated with the United States, delays occur in this 
program as well. Delays occur most often due to the extensive background checks 
conducted by the United States. As refugees wait to be cleared, they remain in dangerous 
situations for extended periods of time.58 
The US response to the Iraqi refugee crisis can thus be seen from two angles: the 
humanitarian angle and the policy angle. As a major world power, the United States has 
had the financial resources to provide major humanitarian support to UNHCR and its 
other international partners. By allocating funds through congressional budgetary 
supplements, the United States has successfully provided funding to international 
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organizations, which then put this money to work in Iraq and neighboring countries. On 
the other hand, the US policy response has been less than decisive. An initial desire to not 
acknowledge the severity of the crisis, coupled with slow-moving bureaucratic decision-
making, suggests that a further analysis of the factors affecting the final policy is 
necessary.   
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CHAPTER 4: FACTORS INFLUENCING THE US POLICY RESPONSE  
 
Influencing Factors Defined 
Behind each policy decision exists a multitude of factors and variables that 
contribute to the final outcome. By looking at specific events and the resulting policy 
decisions over time, patterns concerning repeating influential factors come to the 
forefront. By comparing the reactions of the United States and other nations to previous 
refugee crises, scholars have assembled models that define specific motivating factors 
behind policy responses. In order to analyze the US response to the Iraqi refugee crisis, 
specific and relevant influential factors must be identified. Scholars have identified the 
following factors that most directly affect a nation’s response to a refugee crisis: costs 
and benefits of accepting international assistance, relations with the sending country, 
political calculations about the local community’s absorption capacity, and national 
security considerations.1 
The first influential factor, a cost-benefit analysis of accepting international 
assistance and complying with an international response, can be heavily influenced by 
bureaucratic choices and diplomatic considerations. Foreign policy goals, as well as 
domestic demands, influence asylum and immigration policy.  In addition to 
humanitarian concerns and taking into account the needs of the applicants, military, 
economic and diplomatic relations all shape asylum policy in the United States. In 
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general, migration policy can be viewed as a foreign policy tool on one hand and a means 
of achieving humanitarian goals on the other.  
Marc Rosenblum and Idean Salehyan postulate that popular opinion and 
congressional action shape decisions by the executive branch to enforce asylum policies. 
Domestic politics and political opinion can determine the balance between prevailing 
international humanitarian norms and the traditional interests of the state. Public opinion 
also has an independent effect on asylum approval rates. In addition, domestic attention 
on immigration issues constrains a more liberal asylum policy. Rosenblum and Salehyan 
have also found that media and congressional attention play an important role in 
influencing how the executive branch makes enforcement decisions. Popular attention to 
asylum increases the importance of humanitarian concerns relative to instrumental factors. 
The effect of congressional attention depends on whether asylum is seen as an 
enforcement or humanitarian issue. The importance of these factors has also changed 
over time.2 
This model falls under the analytical perspective of domestic liberalism. From the 
perspective of domestic liberalism, Andrew Moravscik writes that the multiplicity of 
domestic coalitions and institutions all have specific preferences and interests, and that 
the state is an institution representative of these societal preferences. So, variations in 
domestic state structure and bureaucracy can explain the variations in state behavior, and 
thus determine international cooperation or conflict. From the standpoint of ideational 
liberalism, domestic social identities and values are the basic determinants of state 
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preferences.3 This goes hand in hand with the idea that asylum policy is influenced by 
both humanitarian and non-humanitarian factors. 
One important aspect of the cost-benefit variable is that prior bureaucratic 
decisions affect subsequent bureaucratic and policy decisions. As previously stated, in the 
case of refugee policy, policy outputs become policy inputs, and vice versa. In the United 
States, policy regarding Iraqi refugees has been necessarily linked to broader US policy 
on Iraq. In a report to Congress on the proposed refugee admissions for FY 2007, 
officials stated, “It is hoped that significant numbers of Iraqi refugees located throughout 
the Middle East and Europe will soon be able to return home, although the security 
situation will remain an important consideration in repatriation.” When establishing 
resettlement policies, the United States must take into account any policy implications for 
refugee resettlement in the past, present and future. Attitudes towards resettlement 
policies change depending on whether the situation of Iraqi refugees is viewed as a 
temporary or permanent situation.4  
 
Principal-Agent Relationship 
In the United States, this sort of cost-benefit analysis and the allocation of refugee 
responsibility to specific agencies had a substantial affect on the policy outcome in 
response to the Iraqi refugee crisis. Specifically, the separation of the legislative and 
executive branches of government in the United States contributed to a varied and 
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inconsistent policy response. Rosenblum and Salehyan categorize the relationship 
between Congress (the legislative branch) and the executive branch with regards to 
asylum enforcement as a “principal-agent relationship.” As mentioned, by traditional 
principal-agent theory (PAT), Congress acts as the “principal” by determining refugee 
and asylum policy, and the president and executive branch act as “agents” that must 
enforce the policies. By this model, the agent can choose to act in line with its own 
preferences over that of the principal due to an informational asymmetry. For this reason, 
the principal imposes a system of incentives to motivate the agent to act in accordance 
with its wishes.5 
Gary Miller goes further to describe the principal-agent relationship by asserting 
that although Congress may be ignorant of bureaucratic behavior, congressional 
committees still create a system of incentives for the executive by providing both 
sanctions and rewards. Specifically, he describes how the threat of “ex post sanctions” 
creates “ex ante incentives” to the executive branch to act in accordance with Congress. 
In effect, congressional committees and hearings create an implicit contract based on the 
observable effects of specific bureaucratic behavior. From this theory, one can conclude 
that the more effective the system of incentives created by the principal, the fewer 
“sanctions” in the form of congressional hearings would occur.6  
One reason asylum and refugee policy falls under the principal-agent model is 
that oftentimes Congress and the president disagree on migration policy due to 
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preferences established by distinct institutional constituencies. By nature, members of 
Congress are more susceptible to specific interest-group lobbies; the president is less 
susceptible to short-term pressure from interest groups because of his broader 
constituencies. By comparison, the president’s decisions regarding asylum and refugee 
policy, within the executive branch, more strongly relate to diplomatic and national 
security implications. In addition, the executive branch can often effectively exercise its 
preferences because the execution of migration policy falls to the Department of 
Homeland Security.7  By the PAT model, Congress measures bureaucratic cooperation by 
gauging constituent responses to bureaucratic behavior. Since congressional decisions are 
based largely on constituent response and the desire for reelection, Congress is typically 
able to spend time on more divisive issues while simultaneously spending less time 
monitoring and overseeing issues about which constituents are silent and satisfied.8 
One central, canonical assumption of traditional PAT is that there exists one, 
unified principal acting on coherent assumptions. In the United States, the separation of 
powers, as well as the highly competitive partisan politics, mean that bureaucratic 
agencies are not entirely unified. As mentioned, congressional principals are subject to 
the whims of their respective interest groups and are constantly competing for majority 
status and appropriation funding. The existence of multiple, opposing congressional 
committees translates to an enhanced ability of the bureaucratic agents to use their 
information asymmetry to their advantage. So, actual congressional dominance is 
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tempered by the existence of multiple principals.9 In this case, partisan divisions and the 
separation of refugee policy between multiple agencies prevented the principal from 
exercising ultimate control until the conclusion of major congressional hearings, 
beginning in 2007.  
Historically, the principal-agent relationship has been evident in the United States, 
especially in the case of humanitarian migration policy. Presidents have repeatedly 
exercised executive power to accept applicants from rival countries while rejecting 
applicants from countries with pro-US governments. As the president seeks greater 
autonomy to pursue his own foreign policy and diplomacy goals, Congress continuously 
uses its legislative power to reign in presidential power. Naturally, left-right partisan 
differences between the executive and legislative branches also affect the principal-agent 
relationship and migration policy outcomes.10   
 
Foreign Policy Considerations 
The second factor applies directly to the relationship between the host country and 
the sending country, in this case between the United States and Iraq. Although granting 
refugee and asylum status is, on one hand, a humanitarian act, it also contains inherent 
implications for foreign policy. Granting refugee status publicly acknowledges a crisis of 
human rights in the sending country, and receiving refugees and asylum seekers can be 
seen as an act of harboring dissidents. This is why nations are more likely to accept 
refugees from hostile regimes, and why they are more hesitant to accept applicants from 
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friendly regimes.11 This becomes evident when analyzing the former US program of 
systematically denying asylum-seekers from Guatemala, El Salvador and Haiti. In each 
of these countries, the United States had provided military and police assistance to the 
governing regime. Accepting refugees from these countries would acknowledge and 
suggest complicity with human rights violations occurring there, and it would also 
suggest a level of responsibility for the humanitarian refugee crisis.12   
Lisa Ramaci-Vincent, the Executive Director of the Steven Vincent Foundation 
and a witness at a Senate hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, stated that she 
got the impression that some members of the US government did not want to 
acknowledge that Iraq is not a working democracy, and only a titular one.13 Allowing 
more Iraqi refugees into the United States, which would subsequently acknowledge the 
extent of the refugee crisis, would have been an admission of failure of the United States 
to support a functional Iraqi democracy that can protect its citizens. Acknowledging Iraq 
as a democracy is to assume that the government would never permit its citizens to 
become refugees.14  
In this case, the initial reluctance to acknowledge and admit Iraqi refugees to the 
United States stemmed from what Rosenblum calls the “foreign policy bias.” In 
connection with the principal-agent relationship between the legislative and the executive 
branches, the president uniquely exhibits a “foreign policy bias.” This means that 
strategic and instrumental concerns relating to foreign policy have a greater effect on 
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asylum enforcement than do humanitarian concerns. The interstate relations between the 
host country and the sending country, as well as the effect of domestic political pressures, 
thus influence asylum admissions.15  
 
Absorptive Capacity 
The third factor, which is described as a political assessment of the absorptive 
capacity of the local community, is not as relevant in this case. The first part of 
absorptive capacity, which is based on structural and economic capacity, is essentially a 
non-factor in this case, given the wealth of resources maintained by the United States and 
its proven ability to provide monetary humanitarian assistance. The second part of 
absorptive capacity, which can be defined as social receptiveness, also did not play a 
large role in the policy decisions regarding Iraqi refugees. Most often, the concept of 
social receptiveness is established by cultural or religious affinity, which is not present 
between the majority of US citizens and Iraqis. The belief that refugees deserve their 
refugee status can also play a role in determining policy outcomes, especially in 
democratic societies where government is particularly accountable to the public. 
However, as stated with regards to media coverage surrounding the Iraqi refugee crisis, 
hesitation by the US government to acknowledge Iraqi refugees as well as the 
comparable lack of media coverage did not provoke any initial outcry from the general 
public. 
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National Security Considerations 
The fourth factor, national security considerations by the host country, played an 
important role in the policy response of the United States.  After the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the United States made major security changes, which also affected 
its refugee policy. According to a State Department report, on September 28, 2001, the 
State Department banned all refugees from entering the United States while security 
procedures were being reviewed and revised. The additional halting of the active 
processing of Iraqi refugee cases since 9/11 reflects both heightened security measures as 
well as heightened fear of Muslim immigrants and refugees.16 The new screening process 
for resettled refugees developed by the Department of Homeland Security has become 
more intense. This has lead to the delay or blocking of many cases. In this case, those 
refugees who have possible ties to terrorist organizations can be rejected for resettlement 
in the United States.17  
 The United States did experience a steep fall-off in total refugee admissions 
during 2002 and 2003. During these two years, the total number of refugee admissions 
dropped to below 29,000 per year.18 In 2002, refugee admissions to the United States 
numbered 27,110. In 2003, the number stood at 28,400. Additional security features put 
into place after 9/11 combined to form one factor that played a role in the declining rate 
of refugee admissions. In 2004, the total number of refugees admitted increased to 52,800. 
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However, admissions of refugees from Iraq and Afghanistan decreased dramatically. 
From 2003-2004, refugee admissions from the Near East and South Asia decreased from 
4,260 to 2,854. In comparison, between 2003 and 2004, refugee admissions from Africa 
rose from 10,717 to 29,125, and Latin American admissions rose from 452 to 3,556. 
During the 2006 fiscal year, the United States admitted just 202 Iraqi refugees. Between 
2003 and 2005, less than 600 Iraqis were admitted.19 
Ellen Sauerbrey, Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and 
Migration, Department of State, addressed the questions posed by senators regarding 
heightened security surrounding US refugee admissions. She stated that a main factor 
limiting the admission of Iraqis into the United States was the enhanced security review 
process. As mentioned, this enhanced screening process was put into place after 9/11 as a 
security measure to prevent terrorists from gaining entry to the United States. One of the 
effects of this enhanced security review is that since its inception, it has been incredibly 
difficult for Iraqi refugees referred to the United States by UNHCR to pass through the 
screening process. Sauerbrey acknowledged that the low rate of Iraqi refugee acceptance 
led UNHCR to reduce its referrals to the United States.20 In this way, Sauerbrey framed 
the reduced number of Iraqi refugee admissions as a result of national security policy. 
 
The Fifth Factor: Moral Obligation and Ethical Responsibility  
In addition to these four major factors, this analysis would be incomplete without 
the consideration of additional normative factors. Marc Rosenblum and Idean Salehyan 
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assert that the four major factors affecting refugee policy act as a combination of both 
normative and national interest considerations. So, normative and strategic goals are not 
always mutually exclusive, and they most often do interact by complementing or 
conflicting to determine state policy. By the authors’ analytical framework, they 
determined that refugee and asylum policy is predominantly humanitarian based. This 
means that final refugee and asylum decisions are based on norms and interests, not 
solely national interest concerns.21 This argument serves to explain why talk of moral 
responsibility and ethical obligation played a role in determining the approach to Iraqi 
refugee policy in the United States. More specifically, rhetoric that harkened back to the 
Vietnam War served as a harsh comparison of the role the United States played in each 
refugee crisis.  
An analysis of the relationship between the United States and Iraq becomes 
especially pertinent when comparing the Iraqi refugee crisis to previous crises. Many 
scholars have compared and drawn connections between the Iraqi refugee crisis and the 
refugee crisis that resulted from the Vietnam War. Both the refugee outflows from the 
Vietnam War and the Iraq War are similar in some ways, because the United States 
played a role in instigating the fighting that led to the dangerous situations in each home 
country. As a general comparison, the number of Iraqi refugees that emerged since the 
US intervention in 2003 has been far greater than the number of refugees after the 
Vietnam War. By some standards, however, the response from the United States has been 
weaker.  
                                                      
21 Marc R. Rosenblum and Idean Salehyan. “Norms and Interests in US Asylum Enforcement.” Journal of 
Peace Research 41, no. 6 (November 1, 2004): 680-1. 
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For instance, since the start of the Iraq War, the total number of Iraqi refugees has 
reached approximately two million. After the Vietnam War, the United States received 
322,000 Indochinese refugees for resettlement out of the global total of approximately 
583,000. In contrast, between 2003 and 2007, the United States admitted only 2,000 Iraqi 
refugees through its resettlement program. Despite its role in the Iraq War, the United 
States has not allocated additional funding for extra Iraqi refugees. In 2007, the United 
States spent under $200 million on displaced Iraqi refugees. In comparison to the 33% of 
total funding provided by the United States to UNHCR in 2007, after the refugee outflow 
caused by the Vietnam War, the United States provided UNHCR with 52% of its budget 
between 1975 and 1979.22  
Various differences between these two major events have contributed to the 
difference in refugee response. One major difference between the two events is that the 
Iraqi refugee crisis began as the war was still going on. In 1975, when the largest refugee 
flows began following the Vietnam War, the United States had already pulled its troops 
out of Vietnam. In 2007, as many as 150,00 US troops remained in Iraq. Due to the fact 
that attacks between Iraqi and US troops were ongoing from 2003 to 2007, during which 
time large numbers of refugees began leaving Iraq, security screenings of refugees were 
more intense. The additional security procedures put into place after 9/11 were combined 
with security measures aimed at anti-terrorism. Generally, the plight of Iraqi refugees has 
been less publicized than that of the refugees produced by the Vietnam War. In the 
United States, Iraqi refugees have been given little to no media attention and can be 
                                                      
22 Sanders and Smith, 24. 
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considered “relatively invisible.” Another important aspect of the fact that the Iraq War 
was ongoing is that the presence of US troops in Iraq only serves to emphasize that the 
US military had played a role in the fighting there. It also made it more apparent that the 
US-led invasion had failed to maintain a level of national security for the Iraqi people.23  
In January 2007, Congress called a Senate hearing before the Committee on the 
Judiciary regarding the plight of the Iraqi refugees in the “current refugee crisis.” In his 
introduction, Senator Patrick Leahy (also chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary) 
explained that support for bipartisan reform to address the Iraqi refugee crisis had lead to 
a congressional hearing. Leahy specifically mentioned the Vietnam War in his 
introduction, stating that the United States must not make the same mistake twice in 
failing to properly help its allies seeking refuge. His two most important points were that 
the United States must protect Iraqi refugees because of its moral obligation, and second 
that the United States must extend support to Iraqis that are friends and allies. Senator 
Leahy specifically mentioned his desire to help those Iraqis who had aided American 
efforts in Iraq, as well as Iraqi scholars—two groups that he believed were at great risk. 
Leahy asserted that fundamental human rights and national security were not mutually 
exclusive concepts. He called for a return to the United States as a “safe haven for 
refugees,” as well as the need to change refugee and asylum policies in order to avoid 
further injustices.24 
In this hearing, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, too, acknowledged that the United 
States bears much of the responsibility for the plight of Iraqi refugees. Senator Kennedy 
                                                      
23 Ibid., 23. 
24 The Plight of Iraqi Refugees, 1-2. 
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also agreed that the United States has a special obligation to help those Iraqis who have 
aided the United States. Senator Kennedy stated that the United States must also work 
with the countries that neighbor Iraq, in order to prevent major destabilization in the 
region.25   
Senator John Cornyn also recognized the American tradition of providing refuge 
to asylum seekers. He emphasized that the US resettlement program both advances 
American democratic values while at the same time protects our national interest. Senator 
Cornyn asserted that a comprehensive policy towards Iraqi refugees would lessen the 
security threat posed to the United States, protect US forces in Iraq, and prevent the 
further escalation of the refugee crisis.26  
A subsequent Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South 
Asia in March of 2007 echoed the feelings of politicians about the inadequacy of the US 
response to Iraqi refugees. Representative David Scott asserted that “Whatever the 
intentions were in going into Iraq we know what the consequences are. This is a broken 
country. The American Government has a major, major stake of responsibility in this 
being a broken country.”27 Representative Gary L. Ackerman stated, too, that “America 
has a clear moral obligation to the millions of Iraqis who have become refugees because 
of our invasion, however well intentioned, but even more so and especially to the 
thousands of Iraqis who because of their allegiance to us have no future in their own 
                                                      
25 Ibid., 4. 
26 Ibid., 5. 
27 House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Iraqi Volunteers, Iraqi Refugees: What Is America’s Obligation? 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 26, 
2007: 6. 
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country.”28    
As a result of the 2007 hearing, specific policy changes were enacted. At the 
committee’s encouragement, the State Department approved an additional $18 million for 
UNHCR. In addition, the administration recognized that an additional $60 million for 
Iraqi refugees was required in FY 2007 supplemental appropriations. When the 
supplemental bill passed in the House, it raised the number to $90 million for Iraqi 
refugees.29  
In 2008, a joint hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs was conducted, 
in response and as follow-up to the hearing before the Middle East and South Asia Sub- 
committee in 2007. Gary Ackerman, chairman of the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, Committee on Foreign Affairs, briefed the 
committees on their previous findings. He described the committees’ frustration upon 
learning that the administration had not taken more drastic steps in order to assist Iraqis 
that had worked for the United States. This 2007 hearing also brought to light the fact 
that the United States remained unprepared to process the number of refugees referred to 
it by UNHCR. At that time, the United States had the capacity to process just a few 
hundred refugees each month. Due to the administration’s unpreparedness, processing a 
refugee referral could take up to five months. Another problem deemed egregious by the 
committees was the fact that the United States had refused to process refugees and 
refugee referrals within Iraq; for this reason, Iraqis were forced to flee to neighboring 
                                                      
28 Ibid., 2. 
29 Ibid. 
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countries to be processed in a safer environment.30  
Bill Delahunt, Chairman on the Subcommittee on International Organizations, 
Human Rights, and Oversight, also stated:  
I would submit that this sad reality imposes a moral responsibility on both the 
administration and the Congress, for we cannot deny that the invasion of Iraq was 
the proximate cause of this human tragedy. So, our response should be timely, 
decisive, and fully resourced, not simply because it is right and reflects our values, 
but it will prevent, in my opinion, further erosion of how we are viewed in the 
Middle East. And that is important.31 
 
In this way, Delahunt references the moral and ethical obligation of the United States to 
take care of refugees that its military actions effectively helped to create. This obligation, 
reminiscent of the policy response to the Vietnam War, was the impetus for hearings to 
persuade Congress to take stronger action.  
Over the year between March 2007 and March 2008, Congress increased the 
number of special immigrant visas available to Iraqis who worked for the United States to 
500 and later 5,000. Within that category, Congress also expanded the types of 
employment that would be eligible for the special immigrant visas. In addition, Congress 
required that the Secretary of State establish a mechanism for refugee processing within 
Iraq. During this same time period, the Administration issued all 500 special immigrant 
visas available under the first law.32  
In this case, the historical example of the Vietnam War served as a harsh reminder 
of the role played by the United States in the creation of the Iraqi refugee crisis.  So, 
                                                      
30 House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Neglected Responsibilities: The U.S. Response To The Iraqi 
Refugee Crisis: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia and the Subcommittee 
on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight. 110th Cong., 2nd sess., March 11, 2008: 1.  
31 Ibid., 7.  
32 Ibid., 2. 
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normative factors, in addition to the non-normative factors like as military, economic and 
diplomatic relations with the host country, have influenced refugee policy and asylum 
approval rates. Rhetoric of moral and ethical obligation towards Iraqi refugees was 
asserted at both the personal and the national level. That is, members of Congress 
asserted, on behalf of the administration, that action had to be taken to correct certain 
foreign policy wrongs.  This line of reasoning suggests that the international refugee 
regime, as established by the 1951 Convention, is derived from a naturally occurring 
moral obligation to assist global refugees.   
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CONCLUSION: CURRENT AND FUTURE REFUGEE POLICY  
 
After considering the policy response of the United States and its political 
reaction to the Iraqi refugee crisis, this paper has determined the policy response followed 
a specific pattern of influential factors. The initial response of the US government to the 
Iraqi refugee crisis pertained most directly to the national self-interest approach to 
refugee policy. Over time, pressure from Congress, international organizations, as well as 
an increasing feeling of responsibility shifted the strategy to a partially humanitarian 
approach. This can be considered the introduction of the fifth influential factor, which 
takes morality and ethics into consideration. This normative factor suggests a level of 
intrinsic compliance with the mandate set out by the 1951 Convention and its 1967 
Protocol.  
In a slightly convergent interpretation, Ryan Bubb, Michael Kremer, and David I. 
Levine suggest that the initial adoption of the 1951 Convention regime was based largely 
on the model of refugee protection as a “global public good.” By this model, the 
assumption is that political and ethnic persecution produces disutility for citizens of all 
states, but the hosting of refugees is costly only to the host state that receives them. Thus, 
public and private benefits from hosting refugees diverge, which results in free riding by 
those states that do not serve as hosts. However, the regime of the 1951 Convention also 
produced a contract under which states agreed to host refugees in excess of the privately 
(or domestically) optimal number. The regime of the 1951 Convention, which essentially 
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obliged states to host all refugees who enter the country, thus resulted in a higher level of 
the global public good of refugee protection. High levels of this global public good may 
explain the widespread adoption of the 1951 convention.1  
As such, complete compliance with the 1951 Convention and Protocol by any 
state is difficult because it amounts to what can be called an “incomplete contract.” By 
this contract, states can agree to the broad responsibilities of establishing legal procedures 
to process refugees’ applications and grant legal refugee status. States can contract on the 
promise to host applicants that are granted refugee status. However, the Convention does 
not require that states contract on the details of individual determination procedures and 
application processes. States are thus able to determine their own standards and 
determination procedures. As states make the path to legal refugee status more difficult, 
this gives other states the increased incentives to alter their procedures as well, in the face 
of larger flows of asylum applicants. As such, this back-and-forth response results in 
what Bubb, Kremer, and Levine call “multiple equilibria.” An almost competitive cycle 
occurs as states seek to maximize their strategic complementarity. So, even as states are 
fully complying with the mandate of the Convention, which constitutes one equilibrium, 
all state are also seeking to subtly decrease their obligations for performance—a second 
global equilibrium.2 
In order to offset this imperfect state of affairs, policy responses to refugee crises 
must evolve in parallel to changes in the characteristics and nature of global refugee 
                                                      
1 Ryan Bubb, Michael Kremer, and David I. Levine. “The Economics of International Refugee Law.” The 
Journal of Legal Studies 40, no. 2 (June 1, 2011): 372-3. 
2 Ibid., 379-80. 
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flows. As previously stated, the large, steady refugee flows of the first half of the 
twentieth century have given way to smaller-scale flows from a wider variety of countries 
and crisis situations. As such, refugee admissions policy has changed and will continue to 
evolve along with the political landscape, in relation to the types of refugee flows present. 
Distinct policy issues will evolve, as individual refugee flows require many smaller-scale 
resettlement programs that present their own unique challenges and solutions. These new 
challenges include the organization of refugee processing and logistics, as well as the 
coordination and agreement among the relevant US government bodies, international 
organizations, and individuals that will benefit from resettlement. Within this new policy 
landscape, refugee policy must become more flexible and easier to individualize. An 
improved capacity to quickly and efficiently approve new resettlement initiatives will be 
the number one factor in improving admissions programs. To fulfill humanitarian 
obligations most effectively, the United States must align the outlook and operations of 
its refugee resettlement programs with the current state of global refuges.3 
David A. Martin suggests that in the quest for a more efficient and effective 
refugee admissions program, the eventual goal will most likely be to define closed and 
finite groups that will clearly delineate and define US refugee policy. In order to 
minimize fraud and to emphasize the refugee status of the finite group, conceptual “line-
drawing” must be completed before resettlement plans become public. Due to the wealth 
of factors at play with regard to refugee resettlement programs, Martin asserts that 
choices to resettle specific groups or categories must be done judiciously and on a case-
                                                      
3 David A. Martin “A New Era for U.S. Refugee Resettlement.” SSRN eLibrary (n.d.). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=766384: 4.  
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by-case basis. As stated, modern nations are extremely unlikely to enact a virtually open-
ended refugee resettlement program that includes the commitment to resettle all those 
whom the public considers refugees.4 For this reason, refugee admissions cannot be based 
solely on any single factor. Instead, resettlement decisions must take careful account of 
the inherent dynamics of refugee situations, which vary greatly by geographic location 
and refugee population. In the absence of a general and open refugee admissions program, 
each refugee flow or crisis must be analyzed and evaluated individually for specific 
positive and negative consequences.  
Martin also suggests that such a candid and rigorous look at the challenges posed 
to the United States in determining its resettlement program is not “antithetical” to the 
fundamental humanitarian aims of refugee resettlement. Instead, this type of analysis and 
examination of each case is necessary in order for the program to respond to refugees 
more effectively.5 In this way, refugee policy may come to represent a marriage between 
orderly, uniform policy processes and humanitarian considerations. The 1951 Convention 
indeed stated that “the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain 
countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations has 
recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without 
international co-operation.”6 
 
 
                                                      
4 Ibid.,, 15.  
5 Ibid., 5.  
6 UNHCR, Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, (Geneva, Switzerland: 1954): 13. 
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